United Nations A/68/885–S/2014/359

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
21 May 2014
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 35
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 19 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit the following information:

- At 1130 hours on 1 May 2014, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles and a Defender vehicle approached opposite the Abbadin position at points B71-2 and B72, near the town of Hawla. Seven members stepped out, opened the gate in the technical fence and crossed the Blue Line at the point having the coordinates Q:736701-N:3676770, entering Lebanese territory by some 20 metres. At 1150 hours, they returned into occupied territory.

- At 1240 hours on 9 May 2014, in the locality of Shahl on the outskirts of Shab'a town, a 15-person Israeli enemy patrol crossed some 50 metres into the area to which Lebanon maintains a claim. They attempted to abduct the civilians Isma'il Qasim Zahrah, Muhammad Husayn Zahrah and Isma'il Husayn Zahrah, who fled, and seized their herd of some 100 head of goats. At 1320 hours, the patrol withdrew into occupied territory, releasing the goats.

- At 1055 hours on 11 May 2014, while the Israeli enemy was clearing grass between points M1 (to which Lebanon maintains a claim) and M2, opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, one of the engineering machines extended its boom over the technical fence into Lebanese territory, where it removed some grass. At 1200 hours, the same machine uprooted a tree on Lebanese territory and damaged another. In so doing, it removed the camouflage from a Lebanese Army fortification some 100 metres west of point M2(2). The machine also moved two cement blocks from within Lebanese territory, placing them south of the technical fence. Enemy forces stopped work at 1400 hours and resumed it at 1500 hours between points M2(2) and B3, north of the technical fence. Work continued until 1630 hours.

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- Between 1600 hours and 1635 hours on 12 May 2014, while the Israeli enemy was carrying out digging work next to the technical fence 25 metres east of point B4, opposite Naqurah, debris was shovelled north of the Blue Line into Lebanese territory.

- Between 1000 hours and 1100 hours on 12 May 2014, some 200 metres from the Lebanese coast off Ra's al-Naqurah, three Israeli enemy launches released two divers, who installed a new yellow conical buoy 25 metres from the existing row of buoys positioned by the Israeli enemy. In so doing, they committed a violation by penetrating 25 metres into Lebanese waters, as well as by installing the buoys. The divers then left on a launch into occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1145 hours, two Israeli launches proceeding from within occupied Palestinian waters removed the old buoy No. 1.

Those actions are a clear violation of my country's sovereignty and of the relevant international resolutions, particularly Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). They also clearly contravene the Charter of the United Nations and the principles and provisions of international law. I reiterate my Government's commitment to its obligations under international resolutions and, on behalf of my Government, call on the Security Council to condemn those violations in the strongest possible terms and prevail on Israel to end its violations of Lebanese sovereignty, whether in the air, at sea or on land, and implement all of its obligations under Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2014/360

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 May 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 20 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I would like to bring to your attention a letter dated 7 May 2014 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan addressed to Mr. Erik Marzolf, Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar T. **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 20 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to you regarding the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), issued as a document of the Security Council (S/2013/337) on 11 June 2013.

Paragraphs 50, 90 and 92 of the report mention the Republic of Azerbaijan in connection with the case of Mr. Michael Ranger, a citizen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, convicted in 2012 of illegal arms trade. I would like to inform you that the internal inquiry carried out by the relevant authorities of Azerbaijan has not produced any evidence of any meeting and talks between a representative of Azerbaijan and Mr. Michael Ranger or Hesong Trade Corporation on any kind of arms deal. No such authorization has ever been given by the Government of Azerbaijan to any person.

It would be pertinent to state in that regard that Azerbaijan maintains a strong national export control system and constantly develops its efficiency in order to prevent illegal activities relating to arms, military and dual-use goods, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. Moreover, Azerbaijan recognizes the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and fully supports timely and effective implementation of its resolutions. My country takes all measures to enforce the respective provisions of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013).

Azerbaijan stands ready to continue its cooperation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and the Panel of Experts. We would like to request that in the future any information relating to Azerbaijan be shared with us well in advance in order to enable our timely response and clarifications.

I would appreciate the publication of this letter as an annex to the next report of the Panel of Experts.

(*Signed*) Tofig **Musayev**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative

United Nations A/68/884–S/2014/361

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
21 May 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 35
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 19 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Please find enclosed a copy of a letter I sent today to all United Nations Member States and Observers together with the Governments of Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Chile, the Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Samoa, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay* (see annex I).

The said letter calls upon all United Nations Member States to co-sponsor the French draft Security Council resolution referring the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 to the International Criminal Court.

Since we believe that this letter is of interest to all States Members of the United Nations, we would like to request its circulation as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council, in connection with the item "The situation in the Middle East".

(*Signed*) Paul **Seger**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Clarification on the part of Switzerland, on the basis of clarification received from the Mission of Uruguay: While Uruguay strongly supports a referral, it will be unable to co-sponsor the draft resolution and therefore prefers not to associate itself with the call for co-sponsorship.

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Annexes to the letter dated 19 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Annex I

To all United Nations Member States and Observers: Call for co-sponsorship of the French draft Security Council resolution (attached) referring the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to the International Criminal Court

I am writing to you on behalf of the following 58 States: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Chile, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Samoa, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay,* and my own country, Switzerland.

You may recall that, on 14 January 2013, the same group of 58 States sent a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2013/19) expressing our firm view that the Council must ensure accountability for the crimes committed in the Syrian Arab Republic. We asked that the Security Council act "by referring the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic as of March 2011 to the International Criminal Court without exceptions and irrespective of the alleged perpetrators".

Since then, the conflict has only grown in intensity and scope. More than 150,000 are estimated to have died, many of them civilians. Over 2.7 million have fled the country as refugees, and more than 6.5 million are internally displaced. Abuses and violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law continue on a daily basis and in a pervasive climate of impunity; many have been documented. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, has repeatedly called for a referral, and so has the Independent Commission of Inquiry mandated by the Human Rights Council.

Over one year after the collective call of the 58 States and on the basis of an initiative by France, Council members will this Thursday take action on a draft resolution (see annex II) that would refer the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to the International Criminal Court. France has indicated that it will open the resolution for co-sponsorship to the wider United Nations membership. To co-sponsor the resolution, delegations need to submit a rule 37 request to the Security Council Affairs Division. A copy of the signed letter (sample attached; see annex III) can be sent to dpa-scb3@un.org or faxed to 1-917-367-0406.

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* Clarification on the part of Switzerland, on the basis of clarification received from the Mission of Uruguay: While Uruguay strongly supports a referral, it will be unable to co-sponsor the draft resolution and therefore prefers not to associate itself with the call for co-sponsorship.

While several members of the group would prefer a stronger language regarding the terms of the referral and the support of the Organization, we all share the view that the initiative by France represents the best opportunity to bring at last, three years into the Syrian civil war, the promise of accountability to its war-ravaged people and at the same time to help to deter further atrocities. Each side of the conflict would be held accountable. According to the draft resolution, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court would be empowered to investigate crimes committed by the Syrian authorities and pro-government militias, as well as by non-State armed groups, all committed in the course of the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011.

Against this background, the 58 States strongly support the French initiative. We call upon the Security Council to adopt the draft resolution and we encourage United Nations Member States, States parties to the Rome Statute or not, to send a strong message of political support by co-sponsoring the resolution. The United Nations — the Security Council and the wider membership alike — should be united in acting for justice and accountability for the victims of the conflict in Syria.

I thank you in advance for your attention and your expression of support.

(*Signed*) Paul **Seger**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex II

France and Lithuania: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2042 (2012), 2043 (2012), 2118 (2013) and 2139 (2014), and its Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012, 5 April 2012 and 2 October 2013,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling its full endorsement of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 which states that accountability for acts committed during the present conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic must be addressed,

Taking note of the reports of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, mandated by the Human Rights Council to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic, to establish the facts and circumstances that may amount to such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a view to ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, are held accountable,

Recalling the statements made by the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights that crimes against humanity and war crimes are likely to have been committed in the Syrian Arab Republic,

Noting the repeated encouragement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for the Security Council to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court,

Determining that the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* its strong condemnation of the widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities and pro-government militias, as well as the human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by non-State armed groups, all committed in the course of the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011;

2. *Decides* to refer the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic described in paragraph 1 above since March 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;

3. *Decides also* that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor, including by implementing fully the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court, pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, strongly urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor;

4. *Demands* that non-State armed groups in the Syrian Arab Republic also cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor in connection with investigations and prosecutions undertaken pursuant to this resolution;

5. *Expresses its commitment* to an effective follow-up of the present resolution;

6. *Recalls* the guidance issued by the Secretary-General on contacts with persons who are the subject of arrest warrants or summonses issued by the International Criminal Court;

7. *Decides* that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a State outside the Syrian Arab Republic which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Syrian Arab Republic established or authorized by the Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the State;

8. *Recognizes* that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral, including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily and *encourages* States to make such contributions, noting the need for funding of expenses related to investigations or prosecutions of the International Criminal Court, including in connection with situations referred to the Court by the Security Council, as stated in General Assembly resolution 67/295;

9. *Invites* the Prosecutor to address the Council within two months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken pursuant to this resolution and requests the Secretary-General to circulate the report of the Prosecutor as a document of the Council, in advance of such briefings;

10. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex III

___ May 2014

Excellency,

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request that my delegation be allowed to participate without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, in the Council's meeting on ___ May 2014, in connection with the agenda item "The situation in the Middle East", in order to co-sponsor the draft resolution to be voted upon at that meeting.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sign _____

Print name _____

Permanent Mission of _____
to the United Nations

His Excellency
Mr. Oh Joon
President of the Security Council
United Nations
Fax: 917-367-0406
E-mail: dpa-scsb3@un.org

United Nations S/2014/362

Security Council

Distr.: General
21 May 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 21 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward to you a letter from Najib Ghadbian, Special Representative of the Syrian Coalition to the United Nations, dated 20 May 2014, conveying the Syrian Coalition's full support for a referral of the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to the International Criminal Court, and urging members of the Security Council to act without delay to refer the situation in Syria to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the letter as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Karel J. G. van **Oosterom**

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Annex to the letter dated 21 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the people of Syria and the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (Syrian Coalition), I am writing to you today to convey the Syrian Coalition's full support for a referral of the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to the International Criminal Court, and to urge members of the Council to act without delay to refer the situation in Syria to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

Since the start of the Syrian revolution in March 2011, more than 162,000 Syrian lives have been lost as a result of the Syrian regime's brutal campaign of oppression. Throughout the past three years, hundreds of thousands more have been injured, tortured and subjected to sexual violence by regime personnel and regime-affiliated militias. According to the Secretary-General, as well as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the independent international commission of inquiry and the Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator, many of these acts constitute war crimes, and some reach the threshold of crimes against humanity. There is every indication that many of the most heinous acts committed by Syrian armed forces have received the approval, and indeed the complicity, of the highest level of government, including Syria's Head of State (see, for example, A/HRC/25/65).

Despite the grave and worsening situation in Syria, the people of Syria have yet to see justice rendered. Instead, a culture of impunity has given rise to a new and ever more heinous set of war crimes inflicted by Syrian regime forces, including chemical weapons, barrel bombs and cluster munitions strategically deployed in residential areas to maximize civilian casualties. Indeed, due to the regime's onslaught on civilian areas, approximately half of the Syrian population of 22 million people has been forced to flee Syria or has been internally displaced.

So long as the Syrian regime does not believe there is a price to be paid for gross and systematic crimes of war, the atrocities in Syria will worsen. It is therefore vital that the Security Council heed its own calls for an end to impunity and reaffirm that those who have committed or are otherwise responsible for human rights violations and abuses in Syria are brought to justice, as demanded by the Security Council in resolutions 2139 (2014) and 2118 (2013), both adopted by consensus. For justice to be served, the Security Council must act without delay to refer the situation in Syria to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

The Syrian Coalition has itself repeatedly reiterated its support for international human rights and humanitarian law, and we stand committed to ensuring full accountability for all war crimes, irrespective of their perpetrators. That is why we adopted the Declaration of Commitment on Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and the Facilitation of Humanitarian Assistance in March 2014, and why we have repeatedly urged the Security Council and Member States to support a referral to the International Criminal Court.

Impunity has cast a long shadow over Syria and has done nothing to stop the violence which is now pervasive. Those who commit crimes of war must be assured that their brutality will not go unpunished. The Syrian people demand justice, and they look to the Security Council to help fulfil it.

(*Signed*) Najib **Ghadbian**
Special Representative of the Syrian Coalition to the United Nations

United Nations S/2014/363

Security Council

Distr.: General
23 May 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 16 May 2014 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia, and in accordance with paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 2128 (2013), I have the honour to submit herewith the midterm report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia.

I would appreciate it if this letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Zeid Ra'ad Zeid **Al-Hussein**
Chair
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia

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Letter dated 25 April 2014 from the Panel of Experts on Liberia addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003)

The members of the Panel of Experts on Liberia have the honour to transmit the midterm report of the Panel, prepared pursuant to paragraph 5 (b) of Security Council resolution 2128 (2013).

(*Signed*) Lansana **Gberie**

(*Signed*) Benjamin **Spatz**

Midterm report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted pursuant to paragraph 5 (b) of Security Council resolution 2128 (2013)

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* The annexes are circulated in the language of submission only.

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 2128 (2013), the Security Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Liberia until 10 December 2014. In a letter dated 30 December 2013 addressed to the President of the Council (S/2013/777), the Secretary-General appointed Lansana Gberie (Canada) and Benjamin Spatz (United States of America) to the Panel, with Mr. Gberie serving as Coordinator.

2. The Panel was mandated to conduct assessment missions to Liberia and neighbouring States in order to investigate and compile a midterm report and a final report on the implementation, and any violations, of the measures on arms as amended by resolutions 1903 (2009) and 2128 (2013). The mandate included investigating the various sources of financing for the illicit trade of arms and examining progress in the security and legal sectors with regard to the ability of the Government of Liberia to effectively monitor and control the flow of arms and the security of its borders. The Panel was also required to provide an update on the progress of the Government in meeting notification requirements.

II. Methodology

3. The Panel worked in close cooperation with the Government of Liberia, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). The Panel regularly exchanged information with the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire and other relevant entities.

4. The Panel visited Liberia and neighbouring countries in February and March 2014. In Liberia, the Panel conducted field visits to Bong, Grand Cape Mount, Grand Gedeh, River Gee and Maryland counties. The Panel also conducted field visits to Freetown and the Kenema and Pujehun districts of Sierra Leone, in addition to Tabou, Grabo, Fete and surrounding villages in the Bas Sassandra region of Côte d'Ivoire. Annex I provides a list of entities with which the Panel had meetings and consultations during the reporting period.

5. The Panel pursued investigations into any violations of the measures relating to arms, focusing in particular on the cross-border movement of mercenaries and militias between Liberia and neighbouring States because those groups have been the main sources of verifiable arms embargo violations in the past and remain a likely source of future violations and future instability. The investigation focused on the border region with Côte d'Ivoire in the light of the attacks of 23 February on the Ivorian villages of Fete and Grabo. The Panel accorded priority to analysis of the capacity of the Government of Liberia to effectively monitor and regulate its borders, its existing weapon stockpiles and the illicit trade in weapons within Liberian territory, with particular focus on the legal framework around small arms and ammunition, and on weapons marking and stockpile management of government armouries. The Panel also investigated illicit trafficking as a possible source of funding for illicit arms. That work included an examination of official and unofficial records relating to the illicit trade in narcotic drugs, including the involvement of some security agents as couriers, and the vulnerability of the Freeport of Monrovia as a trans-shipment facility for such drugs. In all its efforts, the Panel worked with and provided assistance and information to the relevant government authorities, UNMIL and United Nations agencies.

6. The Panel sought the active cooperation of government and United Nations officials during its investigations. It accorded priority to field-based investigations and interviews with primary sources, including State and non-State actors. It sought incontrovertible documentary or physical evidence to support its findings. Its findings were, where possible, brought to the attention of those concerned to afford them an opportunity to further explain or refute evidence presented by the Panel.

III. Current measures relating to arms pursuant to resolution 1903 (2009) and modified pursuant to resolution 2128 (2013)

7. By paragraph 4 of its resolution 1903 (2009), the Security Council modified the arms embargo on Liberia, which was later renewed under resolution 2128 (2013), to cover the supply, sale or transfer of arms and any related materiel and the provision of any assistance, advice or training relating to military activities, including financing and financial assistance, to all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in the territory of Liberia. The measures on the notification requirements were modified pursuant to subparagraphs (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of paragraph 2 of resolution 2128 (2013) such that the Government now has the primary — but not the sole — responsibility to notify the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia in advance of any shipment of arms and related materiel to the Government or of any provision of training. Previously, this responsibility lay with States sending arms and materiel and providing training.

8. Government officials with whom the Panel spoke appeared unaware of the current notification requirement that invests the Government with primary notification responsibility. Moreover, most officials expressed the belief that the Government was prohibited by the sanctions regime from importing any weapons or ammunition or receiving security sector training without prior permission from the United Nations, which has not been the case since resolution 1903 (2009). The Panel explained the notification requirements to officials in the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the President, the Armed Forces of Liberia, the Liberian National Police, the Executive Protection Service, the National Security Agency and the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms, in addition to a relevant member of the Legislature. Furthermore, the Panel helped to facilitate a briefing on the notification requirements for the armed forces, arranged by the United Nations Mine Action Service on 6 March 2014, at which the UNMIL Legal and Judicial Systems Support Division detailed the new requirements.

9. The Panel's investigation found no significant and verifiable arms embargo violations during the mandate period, although it did find systemic weaknesses that require further investigation and attention as UNMIL draws down and the Government takes the final steps towards full ownership of its security sector. This is particularly acute with regard to border security and the continued activity among Ivorian militias operating in Liberia with support from Liberian facilitators. Government officials informed the Panel in February and March of concerns that weapons remain hidden in the forested border areas, especially along the border with Côte d'Ivoire. The Panel notes that the Liberian disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration programme has collected and destroyed 30,807 weapons, most of which (64 per cent) were taken from government forces. Many

weapons were not surrendered to the programme, in particular those held by rebel groups outside Monrovia (S/2006/976).

10. The Ivorian national reconciliation process has shown limited progress, with individuals on both sides of the border, often ethnically and linguistically linked, having in the past perpetrated violent attacks against government forces in Côte d'Ivoire as a way of highlighting their grievances and also to exact revenge for perceived injustices.[1] The Panel notes that elections are often triggers for violence, which can easily spill across international borders and create further political instability. In 2015, presidential elections are scheduled to be held in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea. In February 2013, Guinea held long-overdue legislative elections. In related violence, 9 people were killed and more than 220 injured. The most recent election in Côte d'Ivoire spiralled into civil war; the underlying causes of that conflict remain unaddressed. Any renewed violence would probably cause refugee movements from Côte d'Ivoire to Liberia. Given that militants tend to blend with genuine refugees during such movements, this would fuel further cross-border instability and present significant challenges to the Governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. The case of the attacks on Fete and Grabo and the associated arrests in February highlighted this persistent phenomenon (paras. 43-60 and annexes II and III). They also underscored the persistent weaknesses in the Government's investigatory capacity and ability to secure its side of the border region, together with the limits to Liberian and Ivorian cross-border cooperation.

11. In addition to the border concerns, no weapons have yet been marked as required under resolution 1903 (2009). The Government recently acquired two marking machines, however, enabling it to begin the process (paras. 18-20). The management of the Government's weapon and ammunition stockpiles in government armouries — overseen by UNMIL firearms inspection teams and advisers — appears adequate, if imperfect (paras. 14-17 and 21).

12. Limited progress has been made towards establishing the legal framework to regulate arms and the Panel is concerned that the pace of action is too slow for enactment in 2014 (paras. 29-30). The lack of national legislation governing the importation and possession of weapons, coupled with the inability of the Government to monitor large portions of its territory, impedes any effective arms monitoring by the State.

13. Moreover, the apparent increase in drug trafficking into and out of Liberia presents further concerns for State security. If trafficking networks become entrenched, opportunities for funding illicit arms will increase, as will the ease of moving materiel through clandestine routes.

[1] The Panel notes that the Krahn ethnic group, mainly of Grand Gedeh county, but also in southern Nimba county, is ethnically and linguistically linked to the Guéré in Côte d'Ivoire. Similarly, the Kroumen in Côte d'Ivoire share ethnic and linguistic ties with the Grebo in Liberia, historically located in River Gee and Maryland counties. These are currently the areas of greatest concern along the border with Côte d'Ivoire.

A. Stockpile management of government armouries and weapons marking

14. In its resolution 1903 (2009), the Security Council reiterated that the Government of Liberia was to mark all weapons and ammunition in its possession, maintain a registry of them and formally notify the Committee that those steps had been taken. The Panel is not aware of any such notification by the Government to the Committee. The Panel believes that the implementation of the measures stipulated in the resolution would enhance the ability of the Government to properly manage its weapon and ammunition stocks and would discourage the misappropriation or theft of this materiel.

15. The firearms inspection teams of the UNMIL military and police components conducted formal inspections of all government armouries in 2014. The Panel worked closely with those teams and analysed the report of the UNMIL military component team, but was unable to do so for the other team because its report had not been finalized before the submission of the present report. In the absence of that report and given the need to investigate weapons marking and stockpile management further, the Panel obtained access to and analysed the armouries of the armed forces, the coast guard, the Emergency Response Unit and Police Support Unit of the national police and the Executive Protection Service. The Panel did not access the armoury of the National Security Agency.

16. The Panel's investigation into the government armouries arrived at the same initial conclusion as the current UNMIL inspection report on the armoury of the armed forces and as past UNMIL inspection reports on the armouries of the National Security Agency, the Executive Protection Service and the Emergency Response Unit and Police Support Unit of the national police. The standard maintained by Liberian armourers is adequate, if imperfect, but the markings on weapons and ammunition are insufficient.

17. The Panel has consistently reported on the lack of adequate markings on government weapons. By not marking weapons sufficiently, Liberia has failed to comply with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (S/2013/316, paras. 8-11, and S/2013/683, paras. 6 and 22-25). Instituting this measure would constitute best practice of stockpile management and reduce the threat posed by illicit trafficking in arms.

18. On 19 March 2014, the Government formally obtained two Modern Couth MC2000 arms marking machines that were given to the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms by the ECOWAS Small Arms Unit and the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States under an African Union and European Union project on small arms and light weapons. Two days of training on how to use the machines followed the official handover, attended by staff from the relevant government agencies, including the national police, the National Security Agency, the armed forces and the Executive Protection Service. This is a critical step in complying with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons and strengthening safeguards around arms trafficking and illicit arms.

19. It is unclear where exactly the marking machines will be housed. Some government officials indicated that they would be stored in the office of the Liberia

National Commission on Small Arms, located on the 1st floor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which since 2006 has served as the Executive Mansion. The machines should be stored in a national armoury to ensure proper care and limit the possibilities of damage, theft or improper usage, such as the marking of weapons not currently known to be in government stockpiles.

20. Over time, more marking machines will be needed. Once the Government passes the firearms legislation and regulations, it will need to be able to mark all weapons in its stockpiles and all other weapons that enter the country legally. In all likelihood, this will include a need to mark weapons outside Monrovia. It would be unsustainable if the only marking machines are in Monrovia and the onus is on any weapon owner to bring their weapon to the capital. The likely result would be that many weapons outside Monrovia would remain unmarked and unregistered.

21. The Panel found some minor inconsistencies and instances not in conformity with best practice of stockpile management in the armouries. Examples include a rifle being placed in the incorrect weapon rack, weapons that were not logged in or out properly, inconsistent use of weapon cards, filing and database management errors, storage of weapons and ammunition in non-climate-controlled facilities (which over time damages the integrity of the materiel) and ammunition not being stored in adequate containers. The Panel and the UNMIL firearms inspection team informed the relevant authorities of those minor issues. None of those instances separately, or taken together in the aggregate, constitute significant concerns for the Government's ability to manage its own stockpiles. In the absence of UNMIL inspections, however, such minor inconsistencies are more likely to accumulate and become broader systemic challenges, such as misplacing weapons altogether. The Panel calls for continued efforts to professionalize the armourers and to enhance armoury stockpile management and for the Government, with UNMIL assistance, to build in systematic checks and monitoring mechanisms that will fill the gap left when UNMIL inspection teams no longer monitor the armouries.

22. The Panel received unverified information regarding unmarked and uncatalogued weapons in the armouries and weapons that had been removed from official armouries. To best evaluate the government stockpiles and management systems, the Panel conducted spot checks of the armouries, but was unable to view every weapon because some of them were in use, including those assigned to the soldiers deployed in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. The Panel found only one weapon in a government armoury that was not officially part of the weapon stockpiles: a .22 calibre revolver with two bullets that was being secured in the coast guard armoury. The coast guard informed the Panel that the weapon had been confiscated during a raid. The Panel found no other evidence to substantiate claims that unofficial weapons were in government armouries or that official weapons in government armouries had been removed therefrom. It will continue to investigate.

23. The revolver in question is useless to the coast guard and should be turned over to UNMIL for destruction. Similarly, the Panel observed that the national police, armed forces and Executive Protection Service stockpiles contained weapons that had been damaged or were otherwise unusable, in addition to amounts of expired, damaged or otherwise unusable ammunition. That materiel should be turned over to UNMIL for destruction.

B. Notifications and compliance with paragraph 2 of resolution 2128 (2013)

24. The measures on notification requirements were modified pursuant to subparagraphs (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of paragraph 2 of resolution 2128 (2013) such that the Government has the primary responsibility to notify the Committee in advance of any shipment of arms and related materiel to the Government or of any provision of training. During the mandate period, the Panel was not aware of any notifications regarding arms shipments or training being sent to the Committee, or of deliveries of arms to the Government.

25. The Panel was informed about two likely future procurements of arms, ammunition and training. First, UNMIL trainers and advisers are assisting the national police to conduct a needs-based assessment in line with a request in resolution 2128 (2013) to better equip the national police, in particular its armed Emergency Response Unit and Police Support Unit. The assessment is expected to lead to procurement of weapons, ammunition and materiel in 2014, which would trigger the need for a notification. The Panel stresses that it is important for UNMIL to continue to assist the Government to conduct needs-based assessments that determine the appropriate type and quantity of arms, ammunition and materiel for each armed unit of the Government.

26. Second, there is a longer-term effort to provide weapons to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, although it is unclear whether the steps to procure training, arms and ammunition for the Bureau will be finalized in 2014. Given that the Bureau has primary responsibility for monitoring and securing the country's porous borders, providing proper training and equipment is critical. Bureau personnel have received less attention and technical and financial support than the other Liberian security agencies in the post-war years. Consequently, many have not undergone a meaningful vetting process and have less formal training than national police officers and members of the armed forces. Before arms and ammunition can be responsibly procured by the Bureau, its personnel and officers require further training. The Panel welcomes moves by UNMIL and others to emphasize the central role that a Bureau with enhanced capacity will play in the future of Liberia.

27. As these two processes move forward, it will be important for the Government to take further ownership of its security arrangements by working with UNMIL and States to ensure that they take appropriate and timely action to notify the Committee ahead of possible future shipments of arms and materiel and the provision of training. The Panel emphasizes that notifications must include the relevant information regarding the date of delivery, mode of transportation and itinerary of the shipments so that the shipments can be properly tracked. Failing to do so could constitute an arms embargo violation or result in illicit movements of weapons and materiel. At a minimum, it creates confusion, as the Panel reported in the case of the delivery of 30 Jericho pistols to the National Security Agency from Israel (S/2013/316, para. 7, and S/2013/683, para. 21).

28. Clear communication is necessary among the Government, States, UNMIL and the Committee regarding arms, related materiel and the provision of training. A senior security sector adviser in UNMIL informed the Panel that UNMIL had been unaware of the procurement, shipment and acquisition of the Jericho pistols before being informed of it by the Panel in 2013. This is of concern in terms of UNMIL

support in marking weapons and managing stockpiles, the accuracy of which is undermined if UNMIL is not fully aware of what has been acquired and is supposed to be added to government stockpiles.

C. Small arms legislation

29. National firearms legislation remains absent, but is critical to providing the legal framework and institutional mechanism to ensure effective small arms control in Liberia (S/2011/757, para. 101, S/2012/901, paras. 13-14, S/2013/316, paras. 5-6, and S/2013/683, para. 5). In February and March, there was progress in this direction. On 12 and 13 February, the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms held a two-day stakeholder consultative workshop to review the draft firearms control act, during which a number of shortcomings were identified. Consequently, the Commission reworked the document with the assistance of an outside expert. A new draft was submitted to the Commission in mid-March.

30. The Commission informed the Panel that it intended to have the draft submitted to the Legislature in April 2014, with the aim of having it passed before the Legislature went into recess in July. The Panel notes that, at the time of submission of the present report, the legislation had not been submitted to the Legislature. The Panel is concerned that the Legislature is unlikely to enact the legislation in 2014, given the compressed timeline, its poor record of passing important legislation and the fact that some key legislators are already focused on their 2014 re-election campaigns. Until this legislation is passed, however, there is no national legislation in place to regulate the purchase, possession and control of small arms, possibly creating incentives for illicit trafficking of arms. This has been the case since Presidential Executive Order No. 34, which banned the importation and possession of firearms and ammunition, except hunting shotguns, expired in October 2012 (S/2013/316, para. 5).

31. The Panel reviewed the version of the draft legislation that was being considered by the Commission in March. The draft differs from the 1956 Firearms Traffic Act in several significant respects, which could have an impact on the proliferation of firearms. In the draft, the Inspector General of the national police is invested with sole authority for the registration, licensing and control of small arms and light weapons, ammunition and other related materiel. The Inspector General would create a small arms control unit in the national police tasked with registering, tracking and controlling small arms and ammunition throughout Liberia. The unit would be represented in every county and answerable directly to the Inspector General. Arms brokers would also have to register with the Inspector General, who should maintain a register of all brokers in the country. Those broad powers are, however, constrained in the draft legislation by those vested in the Commission, without whose licences no person may import or export, or cause to be imported or exported, small arms and light weapons or other related materiel.

32. Marking or stamping of government weapons was underlined in the 1956 Firearms Control Act, under which it was mandated that all guns and other munitions of war purchased or imported for the Government of Liberia "shall be stamped 'R.L.' under direction of the Secretary of National Defence before they shall be used". In the current draft, it is stipulated that such weapons should be "marked prior to or at the time of importation" (presumably by the manufacturers)

to Liberia. It is stated in the draft, however, that "small arms and light weapons, or other related materials from government stockpiles" that are to be transferred for permanent use by authorized persons, should be marked before the transfer takes place. It is recommended in the draft that national security agencies, once the legislation enters into force, establish procedures for the registration and marking of their weapons, including with the year of manufacture, the country of manufacture, the name of the manufacturer, the serial number and the letters "R.L.".

33. The most significant difference is the absence in the draft legislation of the discriminatory clause in the 1956 Firearms Control Act that placed prohibitive restrictions on access to firearms by what were termed "aborigines" — or about 95 per cent of the Liberian population. Under the draft legislation, all citizens or legal residents of Liberia over 18 years of age, who have not been convicted of a violent crime and are not of unsound mind or addicted to narcotic drugs, may apply for a licence to possess a portable single-shot rifle. Even thus limited, the legislation further limits an individual to only one rifle and only for professional (not recreational) hunting and pest or vermin control. The Panel commends this restriction.

34. The Panel is of the opinion that, if and when passed, the legislation will establish adequate judicial regulations pertaining to the trafficking and possession of firearms.

35. The Panel notes that there is a genuine danger of firearms proliferation in Liberia if the legal framework regulating the importation and personal acquisition of firearms is not adopted as a matter of urgency. Anxiety about this issue is strong among government officials. The Constitution of 1847 enshrines the right of Liberian citizens to keep and bear arms for the common defence. Government officials, civil society activists and United Nations officials with whom the Panel spoke in Liberia persistently lamented the growing number of violent incidents involving firearms. Such firearms are mostly single rifle shotguns and sometimes pistols, many of them smuggled into the country from Guinea through the country's porous borders. The guns have in the past been used in cross-border attacks by militia elements, making them a potential threat to peace and security in Liberia and the region. Their unregulated trafficking across borders constitutes a violation of the arms embargo.

36. The Panel reviewed crime statistics from the national police and the United Nations police component for the past two years. In 2012, there were 379 arrests for illegal possession of firearms, compared with 178 in 2013. The Panel was told that, the decline in 2013 notwithstanding, greater vigilance by the police had led to an increase in such arrests in 2014. From 1 January to 7 March 2014, there were 38 arrests for illegal possession of firearms, indicating an upward trend. An alarming trend is the growing incidence of homicides involving firearms. In 2012, the police recorded 367 homicides, a third of which involved the use of firearms. The figure was higher in 2013 (133), with more than a third involving the use of firearms. Some of the homicides resulted from armed robbery, the occurrence of which peaked in 2012 (465 incidents). In 2013, there were 259 incidents of armed robbery, pointing to a downward trend. From 1 January to 7 March 2014, however, the police recorded 42 cases of armed robbery, an upward trend. Such crimes test the limited capacity of law enforcement agencies and underscore the continuing fragility of Liberia.

37. The Panel notes that the failure to enact the firearms legislation also means that there is no database of privately owned guns in the country. The Liberia National Commission on Small Arms, which is mandated to maintain a centralized weapons registration database and oversee weapons marking in accordance with ECOWAS standards,[2] has been operating with a lone commissioner since September 2013, even though it is supposed to have three, one of whom is supposed to have a security background. This is presumably in order to be able to perform the task above effectively. As it is currently constituted, the Commission appears not to be properly equipped, even when the firearms legislation is passed, to perform its functions. The Panel urges the Government and its partners to have the Commission properly resourced in order for it to be able to carry out its mandate.

IV. Cross-border security concerns and the arms embargo

38. Considerable challenges to durable peace in Liberia remain in the tightly interconnected subregion, most acutely along the border regions with its neighbours, in particular Côte d'Ivoire. Liberia has weak capacity to monitor its borders with Côte d'Ivoire (716 km), Sierra Leone (310 km) and Guinea (560 km). While an arms embargo might not be the most effective mechanism to prevent cross-border trafficking, it remains one of the few tools to investigate the sources of financing, arms and ammunition supply and the combatant networks operating in the border region (S/2013/316, para. 32). The region bordering Côte d'Ivoire remains of particular concern to the Panel because of the unresolved political and social issues in that country, which have triggered deadly attacks by mercenary and militia groups in the past. The attacks on Fete and Grabo, the arrests made in Liberia and the subsequent handover of Ivorian refugees resident in Liberia to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire highlight four main factors relating to security along the border.

39. First, the attacks on Fete and Grabo were limited, low-intensity attacks that did not threaten the security of either Liberia or Côte d'Ivoire. They demonstrated, however, that some Liberians, Ivorians resident in Liberia and Ivorians in western Côte d'Ivoire continued to have both the ability and the intent to organize, facilitate and attack government targets in Côte d'Ivoire. The Panel's analysis suggests that such attacks are likely to increase in the future. The Panel is particularly worried about attacks in the lead-up to the Ivorian elections in 2015.

40. Second, the operational capacity of groups based along the border with Côte d'Ivoire appears to be limited, making them incapable of truly threatening State security in either Liberia or Côte d'Ivoire. Nevertheless, the groups continue to maintain the capacity to cause localized instability, terrorize the rural population and launch limited reprisal attacks against the national armed forces of Côte d'Ivoire for perceived atrocities committed during and after the electoral crisis in that country.

41. Third, the Government of Liberia has weak capacity to conduct thorough investigations, especially into complicated cases outside Monrovia. Moreover, and related to the quality of investigation, there is weak capacity to prosecute criminal

[2] Liberia signed the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials in June 2006. The Convention provides for strict controls on the transfer, manufacture, possession and security of small arms and light weapons. Shortly thereafter, the Government drafted a firearms control act, which has since undergone several permutations without being discussed by the Legislature.

cases effectively. This is acutely seen in the case against the mercenaries who killed the seven peacekeepers from the Niger in 2012.

42. Fourth, the arrests of Ivorians in Liberia and their transfer to the authorities in Côte d'Ivoire suggest enhanced security cooperation between the two Governments, which is commendable. The transfer of the Ivorians, some of whom were refugees, without due process is, however, an unfortunate example of where that cooperation was flawed. Cross-border security cooperation can be improved significantly, especially with regard to sharing relevant information.

A. Militant activity in Liberia and the attacks on Fete and Grabo, Côte d'Ivoire

43. An example of the Government's weak capacity to undertake thorough security investigations, especially those involving complex incidents that occur outside Monrovia, relates to the arrests, between 7 and 14 February, by the national police of 26 individuals, allegedly for association with militant activity and a plot to attack Côte d'Ivoire. Evidence obtained by the Panel indicates that at least some of those individuals had the intention of joining a larger militia group that attacked Fete and Grabo, Côte d'Ivoire, on 23 February, killing four Ivorian soldiers and stealing their AK-47 rifles (paras. 57-60 and annex III). One of the arrested individuals is a known militia member (para. 49). Of those arrested, 21 were Ivorian. On 17 February, the national police transported the individuals across the Cavalla river and turned them over to Ivorian officials. Some of those arrested and transferred were registered refugees. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has stated that their return to Côte d'Ivoire without due process was a violation of international law pertaining to refugees (annex II).

44. That individuals apparently intent on carrying out militant activity were stopped by government authorities is positive. The transfer of the detained Ivorians to Côte d'Ivoire without due process could, however, have been avoided had the Government of Liberia conducted an in-depth investigation into their background. In addition, by turning over those individuals before having conducted a thorough investigation, it is likely that significant information and evidence was lost that could have further revealed the networks of Liberians and Ivorians that continue to show interest in launching attacks along the border region and have the willingness and capacity to do so.

Evidence of militia activity

45. Evidence collected by the national police and that independently obtained by the Panel indicates that at least some of the individuals arrested had been involved in militia activity with the intention of attacking government positions in Côte d'Ivoire. The evidence includes notebooks, mobile telephone SIM cards and mobile telephones obtained from the detainees, in addition to interviews with the detainees and the Panel's militia sources.[3] It is very encouraging that these evidentiary items were preserved by the national police, given that vital evidence has previously been

[3] Other items that the national police found on the arrested individuals included Liberian and Ivorian mobile telephone SIM cards and many items of magical protection or *zigay* (believed to protect them from bullets, etc.) that combatants carry when they conduct attacks.

lost in the initial stages of investigation.[4] All the items found on the arrested individuals were, however, aggregated and placed into an empty rice bag. That each individual's belongings were not catalogued makes it extremely difficult to determine and prove the ownership of individual pieces of evidence, which has implications for building and prosecuting strong cases. This exemplifies the most basic challenges facing the national police in conducting investigations.

46. The Panel obtained access to two notebooks taken from the arrested individuals that contain incriminating data. They contain detailed information, including a roster of 72 individuals with names, dates and places of birth, telephone numbers and associated noms de guerre (annex IV). Some of the noms de guerre include Bebe Blood, Don't Blem Me, AK-47, Dragon, Sans Pitié (No Mercy), Chien Méchant (Mad Dog), Guerrier Fou (Mad Warrior) and Cimetière (Graveyard) (annex V). The Panel notes that none of the apparently real names were the same as — although some were similar to — those of the Ivorians arrested by the national police (para. 43). The Panel also notes that individuals in the region often use different names at various times, as in the case detailed below of Hansen Kapet Weah, who also uses the name Koudou Kapet Carlos (paras. 50-52).

47. Two separate lists contain the noms de guerre and include designations such as "HP", "CI", "LW" and "231", which the Panel has reason to believe relate to locations inside Liberia. The Panel notes that "231" is the telephone country code for Liberia and that "HP", "CI" and "LW" are the common abbreviations for Harper (a town in Maryland county, Liberia), Côte d'Ivoire and the Little Wlebo refugee camp in Maryland county (annex VI). Another document shows what appears to be the breakdown of individuals gathered from Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire (annex VII). This tallies with witness statements taken by the national police and militia sources of the Panel that stated that the individuals with the intention of attacking Côte d'Ivoire were in Côte d'Ivoire and in Liberia, primarily concentrated in the Little Wlebo refugee camp and villages in and around Harper in Maryland county. Similarly, a highly reliable source indicated after the attacks on Fete and Grabo that three groups were involved. Owing to the haste with which the arrested individuals were sent to Côte d'Ivoire or otherwise released, the Panel was unable to determine whether the individuals named and listed in the notebooks were in Liberia or were expecting to be in Liberia ahead of an attack. Regardless, the evidence suggests — and multiple sources told the Panel — that the individuals in question move freely between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire.

48. The combatants were organized into several smaller groups, operationally linked but under distinct leadership, according to sources in the Government of Liberia, an additional highly reliable source and the detainees' witness statements taken by the national police. This is in line with the way that attacks are often organized in the region and specifically were organized in the past, such as those on Zriglo and Nigre (S/2012/448, para. 82), Péhékanhouébli (S/2012/901, paras. 59-71) and Sakré, Sao and Para in which seven peacekeepers from the Niger were killed (S/2012/901). A document in one of the notebooks listed three groups with three individuals — "Gbegrer", "Kouzo'o" and "Justice" — likely to be the respective commanders of the Force spécial pour la libération de la Côte d'Ivoire, the Force spécial de Dieu pour la libération de Côte d'Ivoire and the Force miraculeuse de

[4] The Panel notes that three mobile telephones taken from the Ivorians and stated by the national police as being in its custody are missing.

Dieu pour la libération de la Côte d'Ivoire (annex VIII). The Panel notes that the notebook also contained a hand-drawn map of the area surrounding Fete and Grabo in western Côte d'Ivoire that included Nigre and Para, where previous attacks have taken place (S/2012/448 and S/2012/901).

49. The Panel obtained further documentary evidence that Hie Gnessoi Brice, one of the Ivorians arrested on 14 February and subsequently transferred to Côte d'Ivoire, is known to have been involved in past militia activity. He is also a registered refugee in the Little Wlebo refugee camp. He was among the some 100 Liberian and Ivorian combatants who crossed from Côte d'Ivoire to Liberia on 24 May 2011 at Tasla, near Youbor, in River Gee county (S/2011/757, paras. 64-69). The group was led by a notorious Liberian mercenary, Mark Doty Wilson (also known as "Mark Miller"), who was subsequently arrested by the Liberian authorities and remains in pretrial detention in Liberia (ibid., paras. 64-75). The group buried a major arms cache in Tasla, Liberia, which was discovered and destroyed in 2011. Testimony from individuals in the group in 2011 indicated that they had access to weapons in Liberia and had also buried weapons near the Cavalla river in Côte d'Ivoire.

Hansen Weah, Augustine Tweah and the role of Liberians

50. There is strong evidence that most of the combatants — or aspiring combatants — in this case were Ivorians. The evidence suggests that Liberians — or those with de facto dual nationality — were the facilitators or low-level managers tasked primarily with the critical function of gathering and guiding the combatants to Côte d'Ivoire. The cases of Hansen Weah and Augustine Tweah exemplify this phenomenon.

51. According to witness statements taken by the national police and obtained by the Panel, Hansen Weah was arrested on 10 February 2014. He gave his name as Hansen Kapet Weah. He stated that he was Ivorian, from Little Wlebo, and initially claimed to have no knowledge of, or connection to, the other people arrested with him. During his interrogation by the national police, however, his mobile telephone rang. The national police officer told Weah to answer it using the speakerphone function. The caller, speaking in French, instructed Weah not to take the individuals to Côte d'Ivoire because the operation had been aborted because the national police were arresting those involved. At that point, according to the national police and Weah's witness statement, Weah began detailing his involvement in the operation, which was to organize and gather up individuals with the intention of attacking Côte d'Ivoire and facilitate their movement from the areas surrounding the Little Wlebo camp to Olodio, Côte d'Ivoire, where the militia would regroup and "train" before attacking the Ivorian armed forces.

52. On 1 March 2014, Weah was released from custody by the River Gee County Attorney, who said that there was insufficient evidence to pursue a prosecution. The Panel subsequently located Weah in the Liberian village of Tuobo Gbawloken. On 13 March, he informed the Panel that he was Liberian, not Ivorian, yet he also said that he was a registered refugee in the Little Wlebo camp.[5] On 26 March, the

[5] Weah's father is Liberian and his mother is Ivorian. He is typical of those with de facto dual nationality who easily and effectively move between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire.

Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission confirmed that he was registered under the name of Koudou Kapet Carlos.

53. Weah confirmed to the Panel the account of the telephone call aborting the operation, indicating that the caller had been an individual named "Augustine" who worked with an international non-governmental organization assisting with food distribution. That entity informed the Panel that an individual named "Augustine" who worked in food distribution had been missing since mid-February. Weah further informed the Panel that he had been instructed by an Ivorian to guide and transport the Ivorians from Liberia to Côte d'Ivoire. He claimed that the Ivorians who sought refugee status in Liberia were given his telephone number and contacted him. His role was to wait until he received a call from Côte d'Ivoire, at which point he would organize the Ivorians and bring them to Côte d'Ivoire. He refused to disclose who had given him the order from Côte d'Ivoire. The Panel continues to investigate.

54. The Panel obtained access to Weah's mobile telephone. Both Weah and the national police officer in Webo independently identified a telephone number listed in his contacts as "Augustine" as the man who had called during the interrogation. Weah's mobile telephone contained other names and numbers of interest, including the contact information for two individuals with noms de guerre matching those in the notebooks cited above: "Kouzo'o" and "You Boy" (para. 48 and annex V).

55. In a similar instance, Augustine Tweah (verified not to be the "Augustine" cited above) was arrested on 14 February in connection with alleged militant activity and taken to the police headquarters in Harper. According to the national police and the United Nations police officer present, Tweah was cooperative and detailed his involvement in what was intended to be a cross-border attack into Côte d'Ivoire. According to his witness statement, the intention was to attack government positions and steal the soldiers' weapons. He stated that recruitment was continuing in the Little Wlebo refugee camp. The Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission informed the Panel on 27 March that recruitment for cross-border attacks was continuing.

56. During the night of 15 February, Tweah escaped from his cell at the national police headquarters in Harper. The Panel later obtained information from two sources that the alleged leader of the Ivorian group resident in Liberia who was arrested had stayed at Tweah's house before his arrest. Similarly, the Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission and another source in the Little Wlebo refugee camp informed the Panel that the six refugees who had been returned from Côte d'Ivoire had been seen with Tweah when they had returned to Liberia and after he had escaped from custody.

Fete and Grabo attacks

57. On 23 February 2014, a group of some 15 assailants armed with machetes attacked the Ivorian armed forces outpost in the village of Fete, located near the Liberian border in the Tabou department of Côte d'Ivoire. The assailants killed all three soldiers stationed in Fete, disembowelling at least one and allegedly removing organs. The attackers stole the soldiers' three AK-47 rifles. No villagers were attacked. After killing the soldiers, the assailants travelled to the larger nearby town of Grabo, Côte d'Ivoire, where they joined more attackers to assault the armed forces position in Grabo, killing an officer and allegedly stealing more weapons (see

annex III for a further account of the attacks). The attacks illustrate three points relating to the pervasive instability along the border region.

58. First, there are Ivorians in Côte d'Ivoire, Ivorians resident in Liberia and Liberians who remain committed to attacking the Government of Côte d'Ivoire. Unfortunately, because of the hasty transfer of the detainees to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, a full investigation into this particular group was not carried out. Fuller information on the nature of the groups, their financing and possible sources of arms has been lost. Furthermore, the intention of stealing weapons is not a new phenomenon and presents a longer-term challenge, given that the weapons stolen by militia elements from government forces have not been recovered (S/2013/316, para. 23).

59. Second, the Panel found no clear source of financing for the attacks. They do not appear to have been orchestrated by elite elements affiliated with the former President, Laurent Gbagbo, as was the case in past attacks. Those involved with whom the Panel spoke, in addition to other sources, indicated that the individuals were working in gold mines around the Little Wlebo camp and also in pit-sawing activities. That groups apparently acting independently of the Ivorian political elite can organize and carry out deadly attacks, however limited, against government forces illustrates the weakness of State security in the border region and hints at the commitment of the individual militants involved. The Panel has in previous reports drawn attention to the potential of illegal gold mining by former combatants to fuel violence. It reiterates its concern that the mines serve as grouping points and self-sustaining staging grounds for militant activity (S/2012/901, S/2013/316 and S/2013/683). The Panel will continue to investigate this issue.

60. Third, even small-scale attacks lead to influxes of refugees to Liberia. Following the attacks on Fete and Grabo, in which only four people were killed, 300 Ivorian refugees entered Liberia and were registered by UNHCR. This has the potential to stretch the capacity of the Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission and UNHCR, which has been focused on repatriating Ivorian refugees, of whom 46,236 remain in Liberia.

Payment of mercenaries

61. The Panel sought to obtain further information about payments made by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militiamen resident in Liberia. During the reporting period, the Panel was unaware of such activities. The Panel reiterates that it has found no evidence suggesting that the Government of Liberia was complicit in or even knew about the payments made to mercenaries by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire in 2013 (S/2013/683, para. 31).

B. Liberia-Sierra Leone border

62. The Panel travelled to Sierra Leone in March to investigate security-related issues on both sides of the border, in particular in the Gola Forest region, where former combatants illegally mining gold and poaching bush meat have previously initiated cross-border armed skirmishes (S/2013/316, paras. 33-36). The Gola Forest remains poorly policed. From 10 to 12 December 2013, a joint Liberian-Sierra Leonean assessment mission found that only 2 of the 17 border crossing points between Grand Cape Mount county, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were manned by

Liberian security officials. The Panel notes that thousands of former combatants remain in the area without jobs and are allegedly involved in trafficking of drugs and artisanal shotguns.

63. In Kenema district, the Panel was informed by Sierra Leonean forest rangers monitoring the Gola Forest of an attack by armed men on the rangers in July 2013, which brings to three the number of attacks reported that year. The Panel has reviewed the official report on that attack made by the Gola Rainforest National Park, dated 29 July 2013 (annex IX). Unlike the previous two attacks, which were blamed on former combatants from the Liberian side of the border, the attack in July was blamed on Sierra Leonean soldiers deployed at Lowoma, in the forest, who have now occupied areas previously occupied by the Liberians on the Sierra Leonean side of the border. Just as the former combatants, they are said to be involved in extensive gold mining (ibid.).

64. On 14 March 2013, the Governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone agreed to hold monthly meetings of the Joint Border Security Committee and Confidence-Building Units, but only one has been held to date. The minutes of that meeting, held in Sinje in Grand Cape Mount county on 30 January, are not available because the participants lacked stationery. The meetings provide potentially very important avenues for sharing security information and enhancing good relations between neighbouring States.

V. Illicit trafficking as a possible source of funding for arms

A. Illicit trafficking in minerals

65. The Panel has in the past focused considerably on how exploitation of natural resources such as diamonds and gold may be fuelling illicit trafficking and conflict (S/2013/683, paras. 103-165). The Panel remains concerned that the Government of Liberia does not provide adequate oversight of mining areas and that there is consequently significant smuggling of gold and diamonds to and from Liberia, undermining the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. The report of the Kimberley Process review mission to Liberia, conducted from 18 to 27 March 2013, was finally issued in mid-May 2014. The Panel has learned from a member of the team that the reason for the unprecedented delay had to do with the fact that the Government of Liberia contested the mission's adverse findings. The findings included extremely weak or non-existent controls at the main international airport, poor record-keeping relating to mine production in regional offices, evidence of routine smuggling of Sierra Leonean diamonds and their certification by Liberia, evidence of illicit diamond mining in many parts of Liberia and a high likelihood that conflict diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire, under a United Nations embargo at the time of the mission, were being processed through the Liberian system. The final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire contains extensive details on the illicit movement of Ivorian diamonds to Liberia, where they are certified and exported abroad (S/2014/266, paras. 200-239). The Panel has made similar findings in its previous reports and reiterates that the problems remain unresolved (S/2013/683, paras. 106-112).

66. In February and March, the Panel investigated illicit mining activities in the regions in which Liberia shares borders with Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone in

order to determine whether proceeds from those activities were being used to finance the purchase of arms by militias or other non-State actors that could pose a threat to the peace and security of Liberia and the subregion. The Panel has found that thousands of former militia fighters, many of them still under the patronage of their former commanders, are engaged in illicit mining of gold and diamonds. The general explanation that the Panel was given by officials for their tolerating such activities was that, in the absence of formal employment opportunities, illicit mining keeps former fighters away from more violent activity such as armed robbery. The Panel found no evidence that proceeds from illicit mining were being used to purchase arms. Nevertheless, the Panel remains concerned that the mines provide recruitment grounds and self-sustaining staging areas for militant activity. In March, the Panel was informed about a new diamond mining boomtown in Wiema, Bong county, which has attracted considerable numbers of former combatants loyal to the former President, Charles Taylor.

67. The Panel visited Bong county, which was the headquarters of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia militia during the civil wars. Although the local authorities were aware that many former fighters were engaged in illicit diamond mining at Wiema, they told the Panel that it was a welcome opportunity, given that the county hosts 22,000 former fighters, or one fifth of all those disarmed in Liberia, many of them unemployed. The Panel will continue to monitor the illicit mining activities to determine whether proceeds therefrom are funding the illicit purchase of arms.

B. Artisanal weapons traffic

68. The Panel found that of more immediate concern to the authorities in Bong county was a thriving market in artisanal or single rifle shotguns, which are mostly manufactured in Guinea and smuggled into the county. The Panel was told that the smuggling was increasingly done by drug traffickers. Bong county shares two official and several unofficial border crossings with Guinea. The rifles are inexpensive; they are sold for between $50 and $100 apiece, and sales are not regulated or monitored.

69. While the weapons may not pose a threat to professional militaries armed with combat rifles, the unmonitored and undocumented movement of such weapons across borders constitutes an arms embargo violation. The Panel also notes that artisanal shotguns have been used in cross-border attacks. Similarly, such weapons are increasingly being used in the commission of local crimes.

C. Drug trafficking

70. The Panel focused its investigation considerably on the persistent targeting of Liberia by individuals and criminal networks as destination and trans-shipment points for narcotic drugs, so as to determine whether proceeds from those highly valued, albeit illicit, commodities were being used to finance illicit arms purchases. The Panel did not establish that to be the case, but received alarming information in Gbarnga that narcotic drug trafficking might be happening in step with illicit firearms trafficking, both from Guinea. The Panel notes that, in addition to undermining State authority, narcotics trafficking establishes and solidifies clandestine routes along which arms can flow. Certainly, the illicit trade in narcotic

drugs affords an opportunity to acquire financing that could be used to acquire weapons, a pattern seen in many countries around the world and in the region. Such factors have considerable potential to undermine peace and security in Liberia and the subregion. The Panel will continue to investigate the issue.

71. During the Panel's border investigations in February and March, UNMIL and Drug Enforcement Agency officials informed the Panel of a growing trend in cocaine, heroin and marijuana trafficking to and through Liberia. They said that a considerable number of those involved in the trafficking as couriers were former combatants and current serving personnel of the military and police forces of the region.

72. Roberts International Airport and the Freeport of Monrovia remain vulnerable to drug trafficking. In a positive step, the Government deployed a joint team of 12 Drug Enforcement Agency and Transnational Crime Unit officials at the airport on 9 December 2013, to be based there indefinitely. The Panel had recommended that action in December 2013 (S/2013/683, para. 174). That same day, the Agency arrested two alleged drug smugglers and confiscated 3.4 kg of heroin.

73. The crime statistics collated by the United Nations police component for 2012 show that 205 people were arrested for drug possession, many for attempting to traffic drugs into and out of Liberia. The figure recorded by the Drug Enforcement Agency for 2013 was 142, showing a downward trend. Of those arrested, 32 were found in possession of cocaine, 36 of heroin and 74 of cannabis. Since the beginning of 2014, however, the number of arrests of drug traffickers appears to have increased, with 27 arrests for drug possession made from 1 January to 7 March.

74. A dramatic case currently being tried in Monrovia involves that of a young man who was arrested on 25 February 2014 by security agents at Roberts International Airport with 47 tubes of cocaine weighing 705 kg (valued at $352,500). He had arrived on a commercial flight from Brazil, his country of residence. Whether some of the intercepted drugs were intended to be sold and consumed in Liberia or were for onward trans-shipment to Europe or North America has not been established. Nevertheless, the small quantities of cocaine and heroin seized on the streets of Monrovia by the Drug Enforcement Agency indicate that there is a growing consumer market in Liberia, with major implications for health and security.[6] It was partly for this reason that the national police launched Operation Pyramid in December 2013, in which it claimed to have arrested 167 drug dealers and users.

75. Of immediate concern to the Panel has been evidence of the involvement of serving security personnel in drug trafficking. On 9 November 2013, a joint security

[6] A forthcoming report by the West Africa Commission on Drugs documents how West Africa has in recent years attracted international drug cartels and organized criminals, leading to the increased availability and use of cocaine, heroin and amphetamine-type stimulants in the region, especially by young people. This phenomenon, it is argued in the report, has the potential to incite corruption within the judiciary and law enforcement agencies in the region, provoke widespread violence and human rights abuses and drive major disease epidemics such as HIV and hepatitis C. The report estimates the worth of the drugs transiting through West Africa at hundreds of millions of dollars, more than the annual budget of Liberia. The Commission is headed by the former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, and was convened by the former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The Panel has learned that the report, entitled "Not just in transit: drugs, the State and society in West Africa", will be launched in Dakar in June 2014.

operation involving national police, Drug Enforcement Agency and Transnational Crime Unit officials apprehended a vehicle marked as a vehicle of the police presidential escort containing 10 bags of cannabis with a street value of more than $36,000. Security agents had observed over several months that particular vehicle frequently crossing the border into Sierra Leone and returning to Liberia without being searched. That prompted the search on 9 November, leading to the arrest of the head of the presidential escort, Superintendent Perry Dolo, and four others, including a serving member of the Sierra Leonean armed forces. The suspects are currently in detention awaiting trial. The Government of Liberia later explained that the vehicle had not been part of the presidential escort for the past two years, even though it still bore the official insignia. The Panel was informed by the Agency in March 2014 that the drugs seized might have disappeared in the custody of the court, jeopardizing a successful trial.

76. On 10 December 2013, a day after the deployment of the Drug Enforcement Agency and Transnational Crime Unit agents at the airport, security officials arrested two national police officers and one officer of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization as they sought to facilitate the entry of a smuggler carrying 3.5 kg of heroin. On 5 January 2014, highway patrol officers arrested an officer from the Police Support Unit in a vehicle carrying 145 kg of cannabis, valued at $11,500. The cases are pending in court.

77. The Panel notes that most of those recently arrested by security officials have been minor couriers, petty dealers and users. This probably reflects the limited capacity of the law enforcement agencies, in particular the Drug Enforcement Agency, which lacks the resources to staff the border areas of the country properly. It may also reflect a lack of incentive to vigorously pursue powerful trafficking rings, some of which may have millions of dollars at their disposal. Liberia has not yet passed legislation on controlled drugs and substances drafted in 2013, which imposes stiff penalties for drug trafficking. It is one of the few countries in the region that has no drug legislation. Those arrested for possession or trafficking of drugs are tried under public health statutes, whose penalties are negligible (the stiffest appears to be a fine of $50). The Panel notes that, although the draft controlled drugs and substances act is strong on criminal penalties, it makes no provision for treatment of addicted drug users. In view of the growing consumption of narcotic drugs in Liberia, this could be a weakness in the draft act.

78. In March, the Drug Enforcement Agency informed the Panel that it had yet to be authorized by the Government to deploy at the Freeport because the Freeport, which maintains its own police force, strongly objects to the idea. This reflects some of the coordination and jurisdiction problems among Liberian security agencies and is a serious concern. Given that the Freeport offers an ideal point for the trans-shipment of narcotic drugs and that similar activities are known to occur in some other States in West Africa, the Panel is of the opinion that deploying the Agency there is a matter of urgency. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has informed the Panel that narcotic traffickers often now move the drugs across borders in West Africa and then ship them in containers through international maritime shipping from unprotected port areas such as the busy Freeport of Monrovia.

VI. Recommendations

79. The Panel welcomes the efforts by the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms to redraft and resubmit for ratification the firearms control legislation. It strongly urges the Government, in particular the Legislature, to expedite the passage of the legislation in line with ECOWAS standards (S/2013/316, para. 77, and S/2013/683, para. 166). This is particularly urgent in view of the fact that there is little time left to submit, debate and enact the legislation before the Legislature goes into recess and before key legislators begin their 2014 re-election campaigns. The Panel also urges the Government and its bilateral partners to strengthen the Commission by appointing the two other commissioners provided for in the legislation establishing the Commission and to provide them with adequate logistical support to be able to perform their mandated functions effectively. Lifting the arms embargo would be premature without the necessary national legal framework regarding trafficking in illicit arms and ammunition and without the machinery necessary to make that framework functional.

80. The Panel is concerned that weapons are currently not properly marked by the Government. It urges the Government, with the assistance of UNMIL, to mark all weapons maintained in government armouries in accordance with Security Council resolution 1903 (2009) and the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Similarly, the Panel urges the Government, with the assistance of UNMIL, to implement a suitable method for marking and recording ammunition stocks as a matter of priority (S/2013/316, para. 78), in line with ECOWAS standards.

81. In the immediate term, the Panel urges the Government properly to secure the newly acquired marking machines in the armoury of the armed forces, which is the best managed and most secure of the government armouries. This would have the additional benefit of proximity to the weapons of the armed forces, which should be the first priority to be marked because they currently have the weakest marking safeguards (only a number painted on the stocks, which could easily be removed). Furthermore, the Government, with the support of UNMIL, should develop a plan with regard to how and where to mark weapons that enter the country. Ultimately, housing a marking machine in a secure location at a port of entry — recognizing that such ports are currently insecure for such purposes — would help to prevent flows of unmarked weapons into Liberia.

82. The Panel welcomes progress between the Governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire and between UNMIL and UNOCI under the quadripartite framework. It encourages the continued exchange of information under that agreement. The Panel urges the two Governments to intensify the exchange of information regarding cross-border threats to peace and security, in addition to illicit arms trafficking, especially at the operational level, as part of the development of their shared border security strategy. The Panel notes that, while it was agreed at the quadripartite meeting held in June 2012 to suspend all alluvial gold mining in the border regions, that decision has never been acted upon. It urges the two Governments to do so urgently.

83. The Government of Liberia, the Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission and UNHCR should consider reviewing the policy of prima facie refugee determinations whereby every Ivorian who crosses into Liberia

is presumed to be a refugee. This policy has led to documented instances of militants gaining refugee status (S/2011/757, paras. 64-69, S/2013/316, annex III, and para. 49 above), creating significant challenges for the Governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire and endangering genuine refugees and civilians. The Commission and UNHCR should consider implementing further relevant screening processes, such as individual determinations of those claiming to be refugees.

84. The Panel stresses the importance of continued support from UNMIL and all the security sector reform partners of Liberia towards strengthening the Government's investigatory capacity, both overall and among individual officers. The Panel urges the United Nations police component to increase its mentoring of the national police with regard to forensics, criminal investigations and transnational crime, including by building the capacity of the national police to strengthen links between law enforcement investigations and evidence collection so that such evidence can be used more effectively in a court of law. Furthermore, the Panel believes that joint training between the national police and prosecutors to strengthen relationships and enhance knowledge of how evidence can be collected and used in court is imperative.

85. The Panel notes that the Government has yet to enact the legislation on controlled drugs and substances that was drafted in 2013 and that Liberia is one of the few countries in the region with no drug legislation. This is a serious gap, given that the absence of such a critical legislative framework undermines the work of government agencies combating the threat of drug trafficking and organized crime in Liberia. The Panel urges the Legislature to enact the legislation as a matter of urgency.

86. Also important in strengthening anti-narcotics efforts is the need for the Government to grant the Drug Enforcement Agency free and unrestricted access to the Freeport of Monrovia and to other seaports and border posts throughout the country (S/2013/683, para. 174). The Panel is deeply concerned that such access has still not been granted.

87. The Panel urges the Governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone to allocate the resources necessary to make the monthly meetings of the Joint Border Security Committee and Confidence-Building Units regular and properly focused.

Annex I

List of entities with which the Panel had meetings and consultations

Liberia

Action on Armed Violence
African Union
Armed Forces of Liberia
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
Drug Enforcement Agency
Economic Community of West African States
Emergency Response Unit
Executive Protection Service
Liberia National Commission on Small Arms
Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission
Liberian National Police
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Internal Affairs
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of State/Office of the President
National Security Agency
Police Support Unit
United Nations Mine Action Service
United Nations Mission in Liberia
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
United Nations police

Embassy of Côte d'Ivoire
Embassy of Sierra Leone
Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Côte d'Ivoire

Gendarmerie
National Police
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire
United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

Sierra Leone

Gola Rainforest National Park
Office of National Security
Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
Sierra Leone Police
Transnational Organized Crime Unit
United Nations police

Annex II

Arrest of individuals in Liberia and the transfer of refugees to Côte d'Ivoire

The national police arrested 7 individuals on 7 February, 8 on 10 February and 11 on 14 February. The arrests took place in multiple locations in River Gee and Maryland counties, in the vicinity of the Little Wlebo refugee camp in Maryland county and among clusters of Ivorians resident in Liberia.

The national police informed the Panel that the individuals arrested had no identification documents at all and no documents relating to their refugee status, such as refugee registration cards or food ration cards. The national police also said that UNHCR had never told it that the individuals were registered refugees. UNHCR in turn told the Panel that its representatives had informed the national police that the arrested individuals were refugees and that that communication had been documented in internal UNHCR documents, to which the Panel was denied access. The Panel requested information from the national police and UNHCR to support the claims, but was not provided with any.

The Panel notes that the Government of Liberia has established a committee that includes representatives of relevant government agencies to look into the matter and provide a full account of the incident, including the circumstances of the transfer of the detainees to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire during the night of 17 February.

On 6 March, 6 of the 21 refugees transferred to Côte d'Ivoire were returned to Liberia by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and were sent back to the Little Wlebo refugee camp. The Panel sought to speak with those individuals once they had returned to Liberia, but UNHCR denied the Panel access to them. The remaining individuals appear still to be detained in Côte d'Ivoire.

Annex III

Attacks on Fete and Grabo, Côte d'Ivoire

On 23 February 2014, assailants armed with machetes attacked the Ivorian armed forces position in Fete, Côte d'Ivoire, killing all three soldiers stationed there before travelling to the larger nearby town of Grabo to attack the Ivorian armed forces outpost there, where another soldier was killed. An assailant was also killed. The assailants stole at least four AK-47 rifles.

By the time that the group had reached Grabo, the assailants' numbers had increased, as possibly two other groups of militants had joined them, as had sympathetic villagers who had joined along the way from Fete to Grabo. A highly reliable source indicates that there were three groups of attackers. This tallies with militia sources that the Panel interviewed and the documentary evidence obtained in Liberia (paras. 49-56). The assailants attacked the Ivorian soldiers in Grabo using the AK-47 rifles stolen from the slain soldiers in Fete, in addition to artisanal shotguns and possibly other small arms that the joining groups brought with them. According to the battalion from the Niger, the Ivorian soldiers fled their position in Grabo, leaving behind their weapons and ammunition, including a heavy machine gun and a rocket-propelled-grenade launcher with three rockets, some of which, if not all, was stolen.

The soldiers from the Niger stated to the Panel that they had mounted a patrol in the area at 6.45 a.m. on 24 February and encountered roadblocks guarded by armed — but unorganized — militiamen. Those roadblocks were probably intended to be ambush points to attack the Ivorian reinforcements, a tactic often used by militias in the region in such small hit-and-run attacks. The attackers dispersed and none of the stolen weapons were recovered.

In the aftermath of the attack, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, assisted by local villagers, arrested a number of individuals. The Panel obtained a document that stated that 19 people had been arrested, listing their names. Officials from the Ivorian armed forces, the gendarmerie and the police informed the Panel that the total number of individuals detained was closer to 30. On 27 February, a highly reliable source reported that 45 suspects had been arrested and transferred to the government security service in Abidjan.

The Ivorian armed forces, gendarmerie and police officials claimed that the attackers were Ivorians and Liberians who came from Liberia, mainly from Little Wlebo. They showed the Panel photographs and videos of those whom they had arrested, including those whom they claimed were Liberians. They provided no information on those individuals, such as their names, any evidence linking them to the attack or evidence that they had been resident in Liberia. They also refused to provide the photographs or videos for independent verification. Security officials of the Government of Liberia informed the Panel that they were unaware of any Liberian citizens being arrested by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, which the Liberian authorities claimed has provided no information on cross-border links of those arrested in Côte d'Ivoire in connection with the attacks. Of the list of the 19 detainees obtained by the Panel, villagers in Fete and Grabo identified three as being from the nearby village of Tiboto. None were known by the villagers interviewed by the Panel to have fled to Liberia.

Annex IV

Example page of the detailed roster of 72 individuals

NOM : [redacted]
PRENOM : [redacted]
DATE DE NAISSANCE : 05-06-1981
LIEU DE NAISSANCE : TOUBA
NOM DU PERE : [redacted]
NOM DE LA MERE : [redacted]
PROFFESSION : PLANTEUR
RESIDENCE : TOUMODI
NATIONNALITE : IVOIRIENNE
N° DE CARTE : [redacted]
N° DE TELPHONE : [redacted]

NOM : [redacted]
PRENOM [redacted]
DATE DE NAISSANCE et LIEU : 10-04-1986 A DJIGLO
NOM DE PERE : [redacted]
NOM DE LA MERE : [redacted]
PROFFESSION : BLANCHISSEUR
RESIDENCE : SOUBRE
NATIONNALITE : ~~IVOIENNE~~ IVOIRIENNE
N° DE CARTE : [redacted]
N° DE TELPHONE [redacted]

Annex V

Example page of the roster of individuals listed by noms de guerre



SAFI

1	231	Kz	M:L	001	KOUZO'O
2	231	VL	M:L	002	Vieux Lion
3	231	DJG	M:L	003	DJE GROU
4	231	CML	M:L	004	Caméléon
5	231	SCP	M:L	005	Scapion
6	231	D.J	M:L	006	DIA JU
7	231	Grle	M:L	007	General BEGRE
8	231	L.W	M:L	008	kalashi
9	231	BCH	M:L	009	BAH-TCHA
10	231	SLe	M:L	010	Silencieux
11	231	RQN	M:L	011	Requin
12	231	2ND C Me	M:L	012	Chien mechant
13	231	KKF	M:L	013	K'AFFRO
14	231	DG	M:L	014	Dragon
15	231	RBM	M:L	015	Rabouni
16	231	SGR	M:L	016	SAGRA
17	231	SCR L	M:L	017	SCORPION BHCK Pass Reseau
18	231	ASS L	M:L	018	ASSAILLANT
19	231	ROC	M:L	019	Rocher
20	231	Mal	M:L	020	La Noscurne
21	231	KTK	M:L	021	Malaweekin Capitaine
22	231	PT L	M:L	022	PETIT CON PLEMME

Annex VI

Two documents listing suspected locations of militants


KAKANEPENAN
(1) KOUZO A.I.P.C.I X LW
(2) KLAABLOW KAFFRO X LW
(3) DIATU JUSTICE X LW
(4) DJEGROU GBELA X LW
(5) SILENCIEUX X LW
(6) CAPORAL DRAGON X LW
(7) SCORPION MENZO X LW
(8) LAVIPERE 0031 X C.I X
(9) BAD .R. 0033 HP X
(10) DEBALE FACE XHP 0032
(11) LABISTAR WATOÊ LW X LW X
(12) VIEU LION 002 X LW X LW
13 JONNI MH DOG FO1-1 LW X LW X
14 LE REKIN 011 FO1-2 LW X LW X
15 RABOUNI 0015 X LW X
16 GUERRIER SOVHEE X LW TIX
17 BAH CHJA GEORG X DB X
18 FIMACHER R-G PK 0018 X
19 LE ROCHER ASSIER 0019 LW X LW X
20 SAN-PITER X 0018 GI
21 ESSEYER B GI
ISAMELION LW X 004 LW X



LWC	(L)
1) KOUZOU	24 BOLLE DANSEU
2) VIEILLION	25 ZINZIN B
3) OGBOGOU	26 SCORPIONS L
4 CAMELEON	27 V. BLAISE
5 SCORPION	28 ANTA L
6 DIAGU J-H-P L	29 OTELLO L
7 BECKET	30 NASROM
8 LUBISTUR	31 KAZOUMI
9 ~~BAH TOM~~ TA-TOSTOU	32 BAH RÔBÔ L
10 SILENCIEUX	33 DEBALE FACE L
11 LE REQUINS	34 SAMEDI L
12 K'AFFRO	35 BOKIDO
13 CHIEN MECHANT	36 NASTA BOY
14 DRAGON	37 SAM BOKOLI L
15 KABOUNI	38 REGUER
16 SNGEN	39 KOFFI BOY
17 ASSIMILANT L	40 TEHLEE L
18 BLACK PUSSREBEL L	41 JEMFOISING L
19 ROCHER	42 CHOTE J L
20 LA MESCLUNE	43 ATASEN F L
21 KETIEBO MYTOUAKON	44 DATORL BROWN BEAR
22 DON'T BLEAM ME L	45 RICHER
23 VETCHO	46 HEBOBOLAY

Annex VII

Suspected breakdown of militants located in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire



Annex VIII

Militant groups and suspected commanders


~~KOUZO'O~~ ~~380~~ F.S.L C-I
GLOBEGREA: FORCE SPECIAL Pour
LA LIBERATION DE LA CI
KOUZO'O: F. S.D.L. C-I
FORCE SPECIAL de Dieu
Pour LA LIBERATION DE LA C I
SPECIAL FORCE de Dieu Pour LA Liberation C-I
S.F.D.L C.I
JUSTICES F M D L C-I
UNE FORCE
MIRACULEUSE de Dieu Pour
LA LIBERATION DE LA C I

Annex IX

"Attack on rangers": report by the Gola Rainforest National Park (Sierra Leone)

Gola Rainforest National Park

164 Dama Road
Kenema
Sierra Leone
Phone: +232(0)76420418
E mail: golaforest@yahoo.com
www.golarainforest.com

FROM: The Supervisor Park Operations
TO: The Superintendent Park Operations/ DPAM
DATE: 29th July 2013

Sir,

SUBJECT: **RESPONSE TO INSURGENT ATTACK ON RANGERS**

On Friday 26th July 2013 at about 9am in the morning I received a phone call from the senior ranger Musa Swaray in charge of the team deployed at Baoma, Nomo chiefdom. He told me that they were calling right from the National Park where there is an Airtel signal. Their concern was about their salaries which they did not collect at the banks due to the patrol movement. I told them to call on me by 11am for further instructions.

At about 12:40pm that same day I again, received a call from a Senior Police officer in Kenema to confirm from me about a report he has received on Gold mining activity in GRNP. I told him that for the past 3-4 months there have been no reports of any mining activity.

Suddenly at about 3:18pm another call was received from ranger Braima Gbatekaka that they have been attacked when patrolling in the National Park by an unknown group of miners who shot at them with shot guns. According to him they fired at them from close range. Three shots were fired wherein Braima Gbatekaka who was in front of the patrol sustained several gunshot bullets on his body. They tactically manoeuvred from that zone to different directions.

This incident was reported to the AIG East, at about 4:00pm and he gave the go ahead to the OC. OSD to provide a Rapid Response team of OSD personnel to rescue the un- armed rangers who have been attacked by armed miners. The team which comprised of 6 armed OSD left Kenema immediately for Baoma Nomo under my supervision. Unfortunately we did not meet anyone at the scene where the incident had happened; it was an old mining site which they have again started to mine. At the mining site we found 3 new empty cartridge shells, saw a new set up fire place and 3 pits of washed gravel in the National Park. We continued our search for two nights to locate their

Empty Shotgun cartridge shells



Set up fire place

Newly washed Gold gravel inside the Mining pit in the GRNP

Position but we only came across their foot tracks which indicated to us that they were from Levuma via Faama.

I met with a former Community Volunteer whom I sent on a surveillance patrol to follow their steps and report back to me at Boboyeima where we established our tactical base. Upon his findings, he saw a place where they rested and got information from several people who said that they saw some soldiers with some civilians that Friday night moving towards the forest with shot guns in their possession. After our patrol on the 28th July 2013 I was invited by the FMC chairman and the Paramount chief of Nomo chiefdom to know exactly what happened. The team went there and met with the chairman but the PC had already gone to Kenema. He expressed disappointment on the incident and advised for the recruitment of the community volunteers in their chiefdom because they were assisting and providing information to the rangers in regards to any mining activity.

The community people are raising an eye brow at the soldiers who are deployed at Lowoma to have again started this gold mining and attempted the murdering of a GRNP ranger.

Submitted by

Charles Conteh

Cc:

The Project Leader

The Acting Protected Area Manager

The Human Resources Manager

United Nations S/2014/364

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 May 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 21 May 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 2153 (2014) concerning Côte d'Ivoire. By paragraph 24 of the resolution, the Council decided to extend the mandate of the Group of Experts until 30 May 2015 and requested me to take the necessary administrative measures.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, after consulting with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d'Ivoire, I have appointed the following experts:

Mr. Roman Brühwiler, customs/transport (Switzerland)
Mr. Raymond Debelle, arms (Belgium)
Ms. Sherrone Lobban, finance (Jamaica)
Mr. Roberto Sollazzo, diamonds/natural resources (Italy)
Mr. David Zounmenou, regional (Benin)

I have also designated Mr. Debelle to serve as Coordinator of the Group of Experts.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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United Nations S/2014/365

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 May 2014

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is the third submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014), in which the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report, every 30 days, on the implementation of the resolution by all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic.

2. The report covers the period from 22 April to 19 May 2014. The information contained in the report is based on the data available to the United Nations actors on the ground and reports from open sources and sources of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.

II. Major developments

A. Political/military

3. Violence continued unabated across the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period, including but not limited to Aleppo, Hama, Deir-ez-Zor, Homs, Damascus, Rural Damascus and Dar'a governorates. Indiscriminate aerial strikes and shelling by government forces resulted in deaths, injuries and large-scale displacement of civilians, while armed opposition groups also continued indiscriminate shelling and the use of car bombs in populated civilian areas.

4. In Aleppo, indiscriminate air strikes by government forces continued in the city and surrounding countryside. Reports indicate that hundreds of people, including civilians, have been killed or injured and tens of thousands have continued to flee the city. Human Rights Watch, which conducted an analysis of satellite imagery from late April to early May, concluded that over 140 major damage sites were strongly consistent with the impact of air strikes. They refer specifically to the continued indiscriminate use of barrel bombs targeting predominately residential buildings and neighbourhoods in opposition-controlled areas. Data on 50 impact sites collected between 26 April and 7 May indicate that the Government had significantly increased its bombardment over the preceding weeks.

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5. Also according to Human Rights Watch, during the reporting period, opposition forces have detonated at least three and possibly four large tunnel bombs underneath government military positions in the centre of Aleppo city. These tunnel bombs have destroyed dozens of buildings, leaving blast craters upwards of 50 metres in diameter. On 8 May, the Islamic Front announced that it was responsible for a tunnel bomb detonated under the historic Carlton Hotel, which had been used as a base by Syrian government forces. Tunnel bombs can be indiscriminate in their impact across large areas.

6. The city of Aleppo experienced significant cuts in its water supply from 5 to 13 May. The city's main pumping station was deliberately shut down by opposition groups surrounding the city, leaving at least 2.5 million people in the city without access to water for drinking or sanitation. The water supply was restored to Aleppo city on 13 May, following negotiations between the Sharia Committee and the Division of Public Services (affiliated with opposition groups) in eastern Aleppo.

7. Over the reporting period, clashes between Jabhat al-Nusra, Free Syrian Army groups and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) led to the displacement of at least 115,000 people in Deir-ez-Zor and Dar'a governorates. Displacement occurred following clashes for control of gas and oil resources around the Koniko gas station in Deir-ez-Zor governorate and after Jabhat al-Nusra gained control of Kerba village in Dar'a governorate.

8. Intensified clashes were reported in Damascus, particularly in the Jobar neighbourhood of the city, which resulted in the displacement of the remaining residents. The neighbourhood is now almost deserted. Clashes were also reported in several locations in eastern Ghouta (Rural Damascus), such as Douma, Mileha and Harasta.

9. While the United Nations remains unable to provide a verified assessment of the presence and activity of non-Syrian fighters on a nationwide scale, non-Syrian fighters continue to support both opposition groups and government forces in the Syrian Arab Republic. Messages designed to recruit non-Syrian fighters continue to circulate on various social networking sites. On 8 May, the ministers of the interior or home affairs of France, Germany, Jordan, Morocco, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America met in Brussels to discuss the issue and measures to improve cooperation among their countries to prevent the travel of their nationals to the Syrian Arab Republic to join the fighting.

B. Human rights

10. Children continue to bear the brunt of the impact of the conflict. Three major incidents occurred on 29 April: mortar shells in the Damascus suburb of Al-Shaghour killed 14 children and injured 81 others at the Badr al-Din al-Hussein technical institute; a mortar attack in the Adra area of Rural Damascus reportedly killed three children at a shelter for internally displaced families; and the explosion of a car bomb in a busy part of the city of Homs reportedly caused the deaths of at least 100 people, including many women and children. More than 100 people were also injured. An air strike that hit Ain Jalout School in the Al-Ansari neighbourhood of eastern Aleppo city on 30 April is reported to have killed 30 children and injured dozens during a students' art exhibition. On 3 May, three mortars landed on the

Faculty of Economy and Trading, University of Aleppo, reportedly killing 12 students and injuring 16 others.

11. Reports of the recruitment and use of children in hostilities, child labour and the detention of children continue to be received through different credible sources. The presence of young people during the recent negotiated withdrawal of opposition fighters from the old city of Homs was also observed, confirming earlier, documented patterns of recruitment and use of children in hostilities.

12. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has received reports of several incidents of alleged use of toxic gas, including during the reporting period. Targeted areas include Telmans in Idlib governorate and Kafr Zita in Hama governorate. Suffocation as a result of the attacks was reported to have caused dozens of deaths and injuries. These allegations have not been confirmed. On 29 April, the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) announced the creation of an OPCW mission to establish the facts surrounding allegations of the use of chlorine in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Syrian Government has agreed to the mission.

13. Humanitarian conditions inside Aleppo Central Prison further deteriorated. The standoff between government forces inside the prison and Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, which have surrounded the prison since mid-2013, continued to adversely affect the lives of hundreds of prisoners and detainees, including an estimated 100 minors. During the reporting period, at least two prisoners died in the prison. Lack of medical treatment resulting from the siege and the ongoing fighting in the vicinity led to the death of a female prisoner on 4 May, owing to untreated tuberculosis. On 6 May, a male prisoner was killed when a guard opened fire on a group of prisoners. The body of this prisoner remained in a cell for two days, before being removed on 8 May. During the reporting period, OHCHR received an analysis of satellite imagery purporting to show the existence of a burial site in the prison complex where hundreds of prisoners have reportedly been buried since 2011. The causes of death reportedly include lack of medical attention for injuries and untreated diseases, some of which are caused by unhygienic prison conditions; starvation; being caught in the middle of fighting between the parties to the conflict; and the shooting of prisoners by guards in retaliation for opposition attacks against the prison.

14. On 30 April, the families of at least eight Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk camp were informed of the deaths of their relatives while in the custody of different Syrian branches of the security services in Damascus. According to information collected by OHCHR, all of the victims were arrested in 2014 and were in good health at the time of their arrest, including two brothers who were arrested on 28 April, two days before they died. Some families have already received the bodies of their relatives and OHCHR has received information alleging that these detainees died as a result of torture.

15. Reports received by OHCHR advised that in Ar Raqqah, on 29 April, ISIS fighters executed seven individuals, apparently in relation to their alleged participation in an attack on ISIS. Images of the bodies of two of the men attached to lampposts were widely circulated on the Internet.

16. Members of the independent international commission of inquiry on the human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, OHCHR and United Nations

human rights personnel, including special procedures mandate holders, continue to be denied access to the Syrian Arab Republic. On 13 May, OHCHR addressed a note verbale to the Syrian Government, requesting access to the country, in particular to detention sites where torture allegedly had occurred.

C. Humanitarian access

17. Approximately 9.3 million people, more than 6.5 million of them internally displaced, continue to be in need of urgent humanitarian assistance within the Syrian Arab Republic. It is estimated that 3.5 million people reside in areas that are difficult or impossible for humanitarian actors to reach. This number includes at least 241,000 people who live in areas besieged by either government or opposition forces. Figures for the number of people in need of assistance in the Syrian Arab Republic will be revised at mid-year to reflect developments on the ground.

18. Access to both government-controlled and opposition-controlled areas has dropped significantly since the previous reporting period. The implementation, on 5 May, of a new transport facilitation mechanism put in place by the Government has been a major factor in this reduction in access. The procedure requires the sealing of trucks carrying humanitarian supplies and is intended to facilitate passage at checkpoints. The lack of understanding of the new procedure by security officials at checkpoints has resulted in delays. Government security officials at checkpoints are stopping convoys which do not have additional facilitation letters. In addition, convoys cannot be loaded because there are insufficient dedicated security personnel in the warehouses in which the trucks are being sealed. The United Nations continues to request clarity and consistent implementation of the new procedure from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs.

19. Food deliveries for the May 2014 dispatch cycle have slowed considerably. As at 12 May, the World Food Programme (WFP) had only been able to dispatch food rations to assist 942,000 people in 10 of the 14 Syrian governorates, reaching 22 per cent of the planned 4.25 million across the Syrian Arab Republic in comparison to 47 per cent achieved at the same time in April. During the reporting period, assistance reached 33 locations, or 12.6 per cent, of the 262 locations identified as being hard to reach or besieged. This included the food and nutrition assistance provided by WFP, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to almost 150,000 people (4.3 per cent of 3.5 million), and non-food items provided to 52,702 people. Of the 3.5 million people in hard-to-reach areas, 2.3 million (64 per cent) received safe water from UNICEF through the provision of sodium hypochlorite, generators and water tanks. WFP reported a sharp decrease in the number of people reached in hard-to-reach areas, from the 302,250 people reached in the previous reporting period to 98,500.

20. Despite these challenges, limited assistance, given the scale of need, continued to be delivered across the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition to WFP food delivery for 942,000 people, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided non-food items to 218,694 people in need. UNICEF delivered 50 metric tons of sodium hypochlorite to the Department of Water Resources in Deir-ez-Zor governorate, and 20 metric tons to the department in Al Raqqah governorate for the treatment of potable water. It is estimated that

1.3 million people living in opposition-controlled areas will benefit from a supply of safe drinking water as a result of this intervention. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) provided support for mobile clinics and medical points in Damascus, Rural Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, Deir-ez-Zor, Ar Raqqah and Hama and provided lifesaving reproductive health services to more than 21,500 women. UNFPA also provided medicines and other supplies to 300 primary health-care centres and three referral hospitals of the Ministry of Health, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and the Syrian Family Planning Association. UNICEF, in partnership with the Directorate of Education and local non-governmental organizations, distributed educational supplies for more than 54,000 students in Al-Hasakeh and Idlib governorates. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) provided agricultural assistance to over 58,000 people in Idlib, Aleppo and Rural Damascus.

Besieged areas

21. Approximately 241,000 people remain besieged — 196,000 in areas besieged by government forces in Madamiyet Elsham, eastern Ghouta, Darayya and Yarmouk, and 45,000 in areas besieged by opposition forces in Nubul and Zahra. During the reporting period, the siege of the old city of Homs ended.

22. During the reporting period, assistance reached the three besieged communities of Nubul, Zahra and Yarmouk. Food assistance was delivered to 16,576 people, or 6.9 per cent of the 241,000 people in besieged areas (to 9,000 in Nubul and Zahra by WFP, and to 7,576 in Yarmouk by UNRWA); non-food items were delivered to 5,000, or 2.1 per cent, of the besieged. Water and sanitation items were distributed to cover the needs of 10,000 people, or 4.1 per cent. Medicines, including those for chronic diseases, were provided to cover the needs of more than 15,000 people, or over 6 per cent.

23. **Eastern Ghouta**. Some 150,000 people remain besieged in eastern Ghouta. A note verbale was addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16 April, requesting the deployment of an inter-agency mission with assistance for up to 5,000 people, and medicines for up to 50,000. Clearance from the Ministry was received on 24 April. However, as no agreement was reached on the inclusion of medical supplies, the convoy did not proceed. On 13 May, another note verbale was sent, requesting approval for the travel of an inter-agency convoy to Douma. During the Joint United Nations/Government Committee meeting held on 15 May, the Government verbally informed the United Nations that the convoy would be authorized. Written authorization is awaited. Eastern Ghouta was last reached with humanitarian assistance on 29 March 2014.

24. **Madamiyet Elsham**. Some 20,000 people remain besieged in Madamiyet Elsham. Three inter-agency convoy requests were made during the reporting period to deliver multi-sectoral assistance for up to 5,000 people, and medicines for up to 37,000 people. All three requests to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remain unanswered. Madamiyet Elsham has not been reached with assistance since October 2012, except for polio vaccinations.

25. **Yarmouk**. Some 18,000 people remain besieged in Yarmouk. UNRWA was permitted to conduct distributions on 17 days and delivered 5,682 food parcels, enough for 7,576 people for one month. However, UNRWA was prevented from conducting distributions on eight days during the reporting period.

26. **Darayya**. Approximately 8,000 people remain besieged in Darayya, Rural Damascus, with no access to assistance during the reporting period. Daily shelling and the use of barrel bombs have been reported, causing extensive damage and destruction. Darayya was last assisted in October 2012.

27. **Old city of Homs**. During the reporting period, a ceasefire led to the evacuation of fighters and a small number of civilians from the old city of Homs, as part of an agreement negotiated by the parties. Under the agreement, fighters were allowed to leave the old city with some small weapons and were transferred by bus to Al-Dar al-Kabira (an opposition-controlled area of rural Homs governorate). The safe departure of the fighters was conditional upon the release of 70 government-affiliated individuals held by the opposition in Aleppo and the coastal region. Approximately 2,300 people exited the old city on 7, 8 and 9 May. Of these, around 40 people were identifiable as civilians (women, children, elderly). Twenty-three Christians chose to remain in the old city. A total of 15 wounded people were transported by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent ambulance, 14 of them to Al-Dar al-Kabira and one to Ar Razzi Hospital in Homs.

28. Since the siege of the old city of Homs ended, large numbers of people have returned to visit the area daily. Large-scale structural damage, a lack of water and power supplies, risks of unexploded ordnance and health risks from open sewage prevent a sustainable return in the short term. At least 50 per cent of the neighbourhoods in the old city are now destroyed or damaged. The Governor has declared the intention of the authorities to restore essential services.

29. **Nubul and Zahra**. Around 45,000 people remain besieged by opposition forces in Nubul and Zahra. On 9 May, a joint United Nations and Syrian Arab Red Crescent convoy delivered humanitarian assistance to the two towns, including food for 9,000 people, medicines for 15,000 and non-food items. On the way to Nubul and Zahra, assistance for 3,000 was also delivered through the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to the four opposition-held villages of Kfar Hamra, Maaret Elartiq, Hariten and Hayyan. It was originally agreed that 70 per cent of the assistance would go to Nubul and Zahra and the remaining 30 per cent to the other villages. However, this was subsequently renegotiated by the two sides to a 60:40 ratio. The United Nations expressed its concerns on 6 May to the Director of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent Aleppo and the Governor of Aleppo that the agreement between the Government and the opposition to allocate humanitarian assistance was based on arbitrary criteria. The United Nations emphasized to the Governor of Aleppo and to the opposition groups that there should be no conditionality in relation to humanitarian assistance.

Cross-border assistance

30. During the reporting period, the Syrian and Turkish Governments approved a second shipment of humanitarian supplies through the Nusaybin/Qamishli border crossing. A total of 36 WFP trucks transporting 11,471 food rations arrived in Qamishli on 15 May.

31. In March, the United Nations sought the consent of the Syrian Government to use additional border crossings identified as vital for reaching over 1 million people in what have proved to be impossible-to-reach areas. To date, the Government has refused to agree to the use of these crossing points, restating its long-standing policy of refusing to use international crossing points not under its control, irrespective of

the humanitarian imperative. The key border crossings required to scale up humanitarian operations are Bab al-Salameh and Bab al-Hawa on the border with Turkey, controlled by the Islamic Front; Al Yaroubiyah crossing point with Iraq, controlled by the Democratic Union Party; and Tal Shihab crossing point with Jordan, controlled by the Free Syrian Army.

32. Since January 2014, international non-governmental organizations and Syrian partners report the delivery of assistance to 65 of the 262 hard-to-reach locations, comprising 25 per cent of those identified by the United Nations as priority areas for access where urgent needs should be addressed. Turkish non-governmental organizations have also been providing much-needed assistance, especially in the northern part of the Syrian Arab Republic. However, insecurity, fighting, threats to aid workers and attacks on humanitarian convoys, in addition to administrative requirements in neighbouring countries and inadequate levels of funding, are among the obstacles hampering humanitarian access by international non-governmental organizations to people in need.

Free passage of medical supplies, personnel and equipment

33. Prevention of delivery of essential medical supplies and equipment, particularly to opposition-controlled areas, continues to lead to civilian loss of life and lack of access to lifesaving medical assistance. Only medicines for non-communicable diseases, analgesic tablets and antibiotic pills are generally allowed into opposition areas. All injectable medicines, antiseptics, serums, psychotropic medicines and surgical items, or any item that may be used for surgical interventions (including bandages and gloves) are routinely denied inclusion in convoys. During the reporting period, 89,652 people were deprived of medical assistance as a result of lack of approval or removal of medical items from inter-agency convoys to hard-to-reach locations. However, thousands more were also deprived of all types of assistance in areas not considered hard to reach.

34. On 4 May, the World Health Organization (WHO) delivered a shipment of 40 metric tons of lifesaving and chronic disease medicines, and surgical equipment for 117,000 people, to Ar Raqqah city to support the local health authorities and non-governmental organizations, including the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. WHO was also able to deliver some medical supplies to the two hard-to-reach areas of Talbiseh and Mashraf, in Homs.

35. The sixth countrywide vaccination campaign for polio took place from 4 to 8 May 2014, targeting 2.8 million children. The numbers of children reached are expected to be available in the third week of May.

36. On 14 May, the non-governmental organization Physicians for Human Rights reported that systematic attacks on the health-care system in the Syrian Arab Republic over the past three years had resulted in the deaths of 460 health professionals and the widespread destruction of hospitals and clinics, particularly in Rural Damascus and Aleppo governorates. The organization confirmed 150 attacks on 124 facilities between March 2011 and March 2014. Government forces committed 90 per cent of the attacks, 7 per cent were committed by opposition groups and 3 per cent could not be attributed. Of the 10 confirmed attacks by opposition groups, 9 took place in the past year. Physicians for Human Rights data also indicate that 20 hospitals were hit repeatedly, 3 of them until they were

completely destroyed or forced to close. Since January 2014, at least 14 attacks on medical facilities have taken place and 36 medical workers have been killed.

Administrative procedures

37. The implementation of the new procedure for the clearance of trucks has slowed down the delivery of humanitarian assistance. By 13 May, at least 150 trucks were held up at locations throughout the country, in particular at the entrance to Damascus, with facilitation letters in addition to the ones already required being demanded by security personnel at checkpoints.

38. The revised visa policy established by the Syrian Government on 4 March continued to be implemented. From 22 April to 15 May, the United Nations submitted 38 new requests for visas or visa renewals. Of these, 11 were approved within the agreed time frame of 15 working days, while 27 remain pending. In addition, 21 new requests submitted prior to the reporting period remain pending, including one from the Department of Safety and Security. No progress has been made in obtaining visas for international non-governmental organizations, with 13 visa requests still pending.

39. During the reporting period, approval was received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for three additional national non-governmental organizations to work with United Nations agencies in Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh and Damascus governorates. On 15 May, one national non-governmental organization operating in Ar Raqqah governorate was officially dissolved by the Government. Several United Nations agencies relied on this organization to deliver assistance to hard-to-reach areas, including food, non-food items and vaccinations. International non-governmental organizations are still not authorized to work with national non-governmental organizations and their standard memorandum of understanding with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent continues to contain many restrictive clauses.

40. International non-governmental organizations are still unable to conduct independent (or joint) needs assessments and monitoring of the impact of their work in government-controlled areas. Where needs assessments have been conducted by international non-governmental organizations, they have been limited or based on unverifiable sources, and it remains impossible for such organizations to access communities openly and directly.

Safety and security of staff and premises

41. Security conditions deteriorated in Damascus during the reporting period. On 6 May, an estimated 20 mortars landed in Damascus city, including several in the area immediately surrounding the location where many international United Nations staff reside. Armed opposition groups claimed responsibility for the targeting of a Parliament building in the area.

42. A total of 26 United Nations national staff members remain detained (24 employed by UNRWA and 2 employed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)). Two UNRWA national staff members are missing.

43. A national staff member of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and an OPCW and United Nations contractor sustained non-life-threatening injuries when a mortar landed in a residential area in Al-Shalaan district, Damascus, on

6 May. On 15 May, an anti-aircraft round hit the UNRWA Area Office in Aleppo and fell in front of the main gate. No injuries were reported.

44. There is increasing concern for Syrian aid workers in areas such as Aleppo, Homs and Damascus governorates, where they are threatened and face arrest by the parties for delivering assistance. International non-governmental organizations have received unconfirmed reports of humanitarian aid workers, including doctors, being arbitrarily arrested while delivering aid.

Observations

45. There has been no reduction in the appalling patterns of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, as documented in my previous reports. Disrespect for human life and dignity remains a defining feature of the Syrian conflict and is at the root of the continued killing, the enforced disappearances, the torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the instances of arbitrary arrest and detention, the kidnappings, and the sexual and gender-based violence.

46. I am shocked by the indiscriminate use of explosive weapons in populated areas, where children in particular continue to be at the forefront of the casualties. Barrel bombs, mortars and car bombs have killed and maimed thousands over the past weeks. I remind parties to the conflict that the deliberate targeting of civilians is a war crime. I am also gravely concerned for the well-being of the 2.5 million people in Aleppo city following the intentional disruption of water supplies by a few armed opposition groups, including Jabhat al Nusra, Al-Tawheed Brigade, Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement, Al-Sham Brigade and some other smaller groups, although water supply has now gradually resumed in the city. To deprive an entire city of a lifeline as crucial to survival as water amounts to collective punishment and is a flagrant violation of the most basic precepts of international humanitarian law.

47. Once again, I appeal to Governments in the region and beyond to stop the flow of arms and fighters to all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic. It is having a hugely destabilizing impact on the region and beyond. Governments with influence need to do everything they can to stop those from outside the Syrian Arab Republic entering the country, regardless of whether they are invited or not, and taking up arms, as well as to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring financial resources, weapons and other supplies.

48. Humanitarian agencies in the Syrian Arab Republic continue to do their best to reach the millions of men, women and children in need of lifesaving assistance throughout the country, despite major obstacles. This assistance is being delivered at great personal risk as needs continue to grow in government, opposition and contested areas.

49. In my previous report to the Security Council (S/2014/295), I described as "shameful" the fact that people were being deliberately forced to live under the inhumane and illegal conditions of siege warfare. Thirty days later, for approximately 241,000 people, this situation remains unchanged. For over 3.5 million others, access to humanitarian assistance continues to be unpredictable and woefully inadequate. Despite the adoption of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014), the situation on the ground has become worse, not better. Parties to the

conflict, particularly the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, continue to deny access for humanitarian assistance in a completely arbitrary and unjustifiable manner. I remind the Council that intentionally using starvation as a weapon of war is a gross violation of international humanitarian law.

50. The next two weeks are critical in terms of ascertaining whether there is scope for progress in terms of widening access. It is essential that the significant problems with the new procedures for the sealing of trucks be immediately resolved without bureaucratic foot-dragging.

51. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic is failing in its responsibility to look after its own people. It is failing in that responsibility through its refusal to give consent to humanitarian organizations to use all means at their disposal, including the use of border crossings operated by opposition groups, to deliver urgently needed lifesaving humanitarian assistance which, by its nature, lies outside the political and military dimensions of the conflict. Arbitrarily withholding consent for the opening of all relevant border crossings is a violation of international humanitarian law, and an act of non-compliance with resolution 2139 (2014). Meeting the demand of the Security Council that all relevant border crossings be immediately opened for the passage of lifesaving assistance is not an abdication of sovereignty. On the contrary, it is an affirmation of the sovereign responsibility of the Government to ensure that its citizens do not suffer in such a tragic and unnecessary way.

52. The United Nations has submitted a list of border crossings which must be opened according to the obligations imposed by resolution 2139 (2014). It is ready to put in place arrangements at key border and line crossings to facilitate, improve and monitor access. These arrangements could include a mechanism to ensure that, even with those border crossings that are currently outside the Government's effective control, cross-border operations are conducted in a transparent way. The United Nations will do all it can to facilitate and enable the provision of assistance by humanitarian organizations across borders in accordance with resolution 2139 (2014).

53. The Security Council, in resolution 2139 (2014), demands that relevant border crossings be opened. It demands that sieges be immediately lifted. It demands that schools and hospitals be respected and protected from attack. It demands that medical personnel and supplies be immediately allowed to reach all those in need. I deeply regret to inform the Council that the parties to the conflict are not heeding these demands. Despite the clearly expressed will of the Council and the best efforts of humanitarian actors, resolution 2139 (2014) has yet to make a meaningful difference to the lives of the millions of people in need in the Syrian Arab Republic. Therefore, I call on the Council urgently to consider what steps it will now take to secure compliance with its demands.

54. Council members are aware that, following consultations with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Nabil El Araby, I have accepted with deep regret the request of Lakhdar Brahimi to relinquish his duties as Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, effective 31 May 2014. For two years Mr. Brahimi has worked tirelessly to bring an end to the brutal civil war in the Syrian Arab Republic. I deeply appreciate the tenacity he has shown and his commitment to the people of the Syrian Arab Republic. While I regret that the parties, and particularly the Government, have thus far failed to take

advantage of the opportunities offered to end the country's misery. I remain unwavering in my conviction that a genuine political transition is the only way to end the violence and pull the Syrian Arab Republic back from the brink. The Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012 established important and valuable principles agreed upon by all participants at the Geneva Conference on the Syrian Arab Republic, and endorsed by the Security Council. The United Nations remains committed to the principles outlined in the Geneva communiqué and to continuing to seek a political resolution to the crisis.

Annex

1. Protection of civilians[a]

Examples of attacks on civilian facilities (schools, hospitals, camps, places of worship)

- Between 1 January 2013 and 31 March 2014, the United Nations documented 60 incidents of attacks on schools, 51 allegedly perpetrated by government forces and 7 by the Free Syrian Army. The perpetrators of the remaining two incidents are unknown. During the same period, 16 cases of militarization of schools were documented: 4 attributable to government forces and 12 to various armed opposition groups (Free Syrian Army, 7; Al-Nusra Front, 2; and People's Protection Units, 3). As a result of increasing insecurity in the affected areas, an estimated 3,600 students had to suspend their education.
- The United Nations is unable to provide a verified assessment of how many of the above-mentioned schools are still, at the time of reporting, being used for military purposes. In most of the cases documented, school facilities were used as military bases, as depositories for weapons or as military residences/offices. In the same period three incidents of attacks on educational personnel were documented, two attributable to government forces and one to ISIS. All incidents involved the arrest and subsequent detention of teachers.

Attacks on schools during the reporting period

- On 3 May 2014, three mortars landed on the Faculty of Economy and Trading, University of Aleppo, killing 12 students and injuring 16 others.
- On 30 April, an air raid on Ain Jalout School, eastern Aleppo city, resulted in at least 30 people killed, mostly women and children, all of whom were preparing to participate in a children's art exhibition which had been publicly announced. In addition, the school was partially destroyed.
- On 29 April, two shells hit the Badr al-Din al-Hussein educational institute in the old city of Damascus in Al-Shaghour neighbourhood. The attack killed at least 14 people (12 of them children) and injured 81 more (UNICEF statement issued on 30 April).
- On 29 April, a private educational facility serving both Syrians and Palestine refugees in the Adra area of Rural Damascus was struck by a high-calibre mortar, resulting in the deaths of four Palestine refugee children and the injury of least 20 other Palestine refugee and Syrian civilians (UNICEF statement issued on 30 April).
- On 22 April, a Palestine refugee child was killed by shrapnel from an explosion in Dar'a city as he walked home from school with friends and family.

[a] The United Nations has a distinct and regular mechanism of reporting on the six grave violations against children in armed conflict that has set verification standards and periodicity of reporting to identify trends.

- On 22 April, three mortar attacks on the area surrounding Dar al-Salam School and the Salhiyeh quarter of Damascus left two civilians dead and 36 others injured.

Large-scale impact of conflict on public services

- As a consequence of the conflict, 4,072 schools were closed, damaged or used as shelter.
- Of 91 public hospitals, approximately 5 per cent (5) are fully damaged (i.e., the structure is fully damaged)[b] and 23 per cent (21) are partially damaged. Thirteen per cent of public hospitals are reported to be non-functioning. A total of 31 functioning hospitals across governorates are operating without emergency physicians, and the management of severe acute malnutrition with complications is only available in 30 per cent of the facilities.[b]
- Fifty per cent of health workers have left the country with the figures higher for surgeons.
- An estimated 20 hospitals remain occupied.
- Sixty-two per cent of the public ambulance fleet is out of service (407 vehicles out of 658), with over one half stolen, burned or badly damaged.
- Local production of medicines has been reduced by 90 per cent compared to pre-crisis levels.

2. Safe and unhindered humanitarian access to people in need

Hard-to-reach areas

- It is estimated that there are 3.5 million people in need in hard-to-reach areas.
- During the reporting period, WFP reached 98,500 people in hard-to-reach locations, 81 per cent of them in areas not controlled by the Government. This compares with 302,250 people reached in such areas during the previous reporting period.
- Food assistance was provided to 149,726 people (to 98,500 by WFP, 28,576 by UNRWA and 22,650 by UNICEF).
- UNRWA distributed food assistance to 28,576 people in hard-to-reach areas (to 20,000 in Neirab, 7,576 in Yarmouk and 1,000 in Ramadan).
- From 22 April to 11 May, UNHCR provided 28,500 people with non-food items, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) provided non-food items to 3,702 people, UNICEF to 19,500 people and UNRWA to 1,000 people in hard-to-reach areas.

Inter-agency convoys and missions

- Four inter-agency convoys were dispatched during the reporting period.
- On 24 April, one convoy to two destinations:

[b] Health Resources Availability Mapping System (HeRAMS) report for the fourth quarter of 2013.

- Convoy to seven villages in Talbiseh (Homs governorate, under opposition control) carrying food for 37,500 people, non-food items for 2,680 people, including children, and medical supplies for 22,765 people, all residing in the Talbiseh area in rural Homs.

- Convoy to four villages in Mashraf (Homs governorate, government-controlled, convoy unaccompanied) carrying food for 10,000 people, non-food items for 1,160 people including children, and medical supplies for 11,000 people, all residing in rural Homs.

All injectable antibiotics were removed, despite the Governor's approval. Povidone iodine and chlorhexidine (both antiseptics) were also removed in the deliveries to both opposition and government-held areas.

- On 27 April, one convoy to Alfoa'a and Kfrya villages (Idlib governorate, government-controlled, convoy unaccompanied owing to security restrictions) which carried food, non-food items and medical supplies to assist 2,000 families (10,000 people) residing in Al Foa'a (1,200 families) and Kfrya (800 families); and to Binnish (Idlib governorate, opposition-controlled, unaccompanied convoy), carrying food, non-food items and medical supplies to assist 1,000 families (5,000 people).

- On 8 May, one convoy to Kfar Hamra, Maaret Elartiq, Hariten and Hayyan (rural Aleppo, all opposition-controlled) which carried food, flour, nutritional supplements and hygiene kits for 2,000 people (500 beneficiaries per village). Taking part in the inter-agency convoy were UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, UNFPA, WHO, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Safety and Security. Two further trucks (each carrying supplies for 100 families) were destined for the opposition-controlled villages of Anadan and Mayer. The convoy took place after two failed attempts.

- On 9 May, one convoy to Nubul and Zahra (rural Aleppo, besieged by opposition groups, convoy accompanied) which carried, for both locations, food for 9,000 people, medicines for up to 15,000 and non-food items for 5,000 people. Taking part in the inter-agency convoy were UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, UNFPA, WHO, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Safety and Security.

- No response was received to the request for a convoy to Madamiyet Elsham, submitted on 28 April for a departure between 28 April and 1 May. In addition, no response was received to a request for a convoy to Madamiyet Elsham, Rural Damascus, scheduled for 14 and 15 May. As a result, the convoys could not proceed.

- During a joint committee meeting on 15 May, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cleared convoys to Adra'a al-Balad and Adra al-Omaliyeh. It was agreed that a technical meeting would be held to finalize the implementation modality. The convoys are now planned for 22 May. The convoys were originally planned to depart between 6 and 8 May, targeting 3,000 people in both locations.

- One convoy for Douma, eastern Ghouta, is planned for 21 May pending the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

- On 15 May, the United Nations hub in Homs sent a reminder letter to the Governor of Hama, as the request for a joint United Nations convoy to western rural Hama submitted on 22 April remains pending.

- A series of inter-agency missions led by the United Nations hub in Qamishli has taken place in Al-Hasakeh governorate, notably to Al-Qahtaniyah and Jawadieh districts on 5 May, and to Amouda and Derbassiyeh on 10 May. The main purpose of the missions was to monitor the ongoing distribution of assistance, to conduct needs assessments and to strengthen relations with local counterparts. On 15 May, the team undertook a mission to Al-Yaroubiyeh, the results of which are being compiled.

Besieged areas

- 241,000 people remain besieged (1,000 decrease following the end of the siege on the old city of Homs).

- Food assistance was delivered to 16,576 people, or 6.9 per cent of those in besieged areas (to 9,000 people in Nubul and Zahra by WFP, and to 7,576 people in Yarmouk by UNRWA); non-food items were delivered to 5,000, or 2.1 per cent of the people in need; and medicines for 15,000, or 6.2 per cent of those in need, were delivered to Nubul and Zahra.

- UNRWA was permitted to conduct distributions on 17 days and was prevented from delivering on 7 days, delivering 5,682 food parcels in total. As each food parcel is sufficient for four people for 10 days such distributions can feed 7,576 people for one month.

Cross-border assistance

From Turkey

- WFP transported 36 truckloads of food and non-food items from Turkey to the Syrian Arab Republic through the Nusaybin/Qamishli border crossing from 14 to 16 May. The delivery included 11,471 food parcels. This is the second time the United Nations has transported relief items from Turkey to the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2014, when an inter-agency convoy with 78 truckloads of food, medical supplies and non-food items crossed the border. An additional request from UNHCR remains pending. The United Nations has requested the use of two additional border crossings with Turkey for the import of relief items. According to the Turkish Red Crescent, other humanitarian actors have channelled around $23 million worth of humanitarian assistance (including $17.6 million in April) on average per month from Turkey to the Syrian Arab Republic through the zero point delivery system administered by the Turkish Red Crescent (excluding commercial or other channels).

From Jordan

- The Al Naseeb border crossing between Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic remained open for the transportation of relief items, although insecurity continues to prevent direct cross-line deliveries of relief from As-Suweida to Dar'a governorate. In 2014, this has included, for example, 321 trucks containing core relief items for UNHCR (with 31 of 34 requests approved,

while 3 remain pending). The United Nations has requested the use of one additional border crossing with Jordan to facilitate access to Dar'a governorate.

- It is estimated that other humanitarian actors transport assistance worth on average over $2 million from Jordan to the Syrian Arab Republic (not counting commercial and other channels).

From Lebanon

- The Masna and Al Arida border crossings between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic remained open for the transportation of relief items. In 2014, this has included the importation of items through both trucks and courier services by several United Nations agencies, including WFP and UNHCR.
- It is estimated that other actors transport relatively small amounts of assistance from Lebanon to the Syrian Arab Republic through other channels.

From Iraq

- The United Nations has requested the use of the Al-Yaroubiyeh crossing between Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic for the importation of relief items. An initial approval to transport items through the crossing was received in November 2013, but remains conditional on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regaining control of the crossing from the Democratic Union Party.

Safety of humanitarian workers

- On 15 May, an anti-aircraft round hit the UNRWA Area Office in Aleppo and fell in front of the main gate. No injuries were reported.
- A national staff member of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and an OPCW-United Nations contractor sustained non-life-threatening injuries when a mortar landed in a residential area in Shalaan district, Damascus, on 6 May. Both the staff member and contractor were hospitalized.
- On 13 May, a mortar shell fell on a Syrian Arab Red Crescent headquarters sub-branch, in eastern Ghouta. One vehicle was damaged but no casualties were reported.
- A total of 28 United Nations national staff members continue to be detained or missing (24 from UNRWA and 2 from UNDP are detained, and 2 UNRWA staff are missing).
- Syrian humanitarian workers face a number of risks, including summary execution, kidnapping, arrest, violence and harassment. The number of humanitarian workers killed since March 2011 is 49: 14 United Nations staff, 34 Syrian Arab Red Crescent staff and volunteers, and 1 staff member of a non-governmental organization.

3. Safe passage of medical personnel and supplies

Attacks on medical facilities during the reporting period

- Syrian forces have systematically attacked the health-care system in opposition-held areas over the past three years, resulting in the deaths of more than 460 health professionals and widespread destruction to hospitals and clinics, according to a report released on 14 May by Physicians for Human Rights.[a]
- Physicians for Human Rights advised that government forces had committed 90 per cent of the confirmed 150 attacks on 124 facilities between March 2011 and March 2014. However, attacks by anti-Government forces are increasing, with 9 of the 10 attacks committed by opposition groups occurring since March 2013.
- From January to end-March 2014, there have been at least 14 attacks on medical infrastructure, and 36 medical workers have reportedly been killed.
- The governorates of Rural Damascus and Aleppo have witnessed the highest numbers of attacks on medical facilities, with 35 attacks each. In Rural Damascus, 78 medical personnel have been killed, with 77 killed in Homs.
- Of the more than 460 civilian health professionals killed across the Syrian Arab Republic, at least 157 were doctors, followed by 94 nurses, 84 medics, and 45 pharmacists. Approximately 41 per cent of the deaths occurred during shelling and bombings, 31 per cent were the result of shootings and 13 per cent were due to torture.

Removal of medicines and medical supplies from convoys

- Approximately 89,652 people were denied medical assistance as a result of medicines and supplies being removed from an inter-agency convoy dispatched to Talbiseh and Ashrafieh on 24 April, as well as the lack of approval for convoys to Madamiyet Elsham, Douma and Adra al-Omaliyeh and Adra al-Balad in the reporting period.

Medical supplies procedures

- A note verbale (facsimile dated 11 April) was sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating the list of medical supplies approved for transportation in all United Nations convoys. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the United Nations that the list was approved for immediate implementation, in addition to a mechanism for the supervision, sealing and offloading of the trucks on the understanding that the trucks would not be searched again at checkpoints.
- The new list differs significantly from a more comprehensive list of essential medicines agreed by WHO and the Ministry of Health in January 2014. The latter included lifesaving and paediatric medicines and medical supplies needed for diseases such as cardiovascular conditions and diabetes and for reproductive health, as well as critical hospital equipment and 168 priority

[a] See http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/press/press-releases/new-map-shows-government-forces-deliberately-attacking-syrias-medical-system.html.

medicines needed in the Syrian Arab Republic, including 92 essential medicines. The WHO Regional Director for the Eastern Mediterranean Region has written to the Minister of Health, copying in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, urging the Syrian Government to treat all people equally and allow equal access to essential medicines in accordance with the list agreed in January 2014. No reply has so far been received from the Government. The United Nations country team has agreed that inter-agency convoys will not depart until approval for medical items is received in order to ensure principled humanitarian assistance.

- For example, on 24 April, the United Nations hub in Homs, in collaboration with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent Homs, organized an inter-agency convoy to deliver humanitarian assistance to seven villages in Talbiseh and four villages in Al-Mshrfa. The convoy carried food, hygiene, water and non-food items for at least 47,500 people, as well as medicine. However, as with other inter-agency convoys in Homs, prior to departure, government security officials removed all injectable antibiotics, povidone iodine and chlorhexidine (antiseptics) from basic health kits before dispatch.

Polio vaccination campaign

- As at 28 April 2014, 36 confirmed cases of wild polio were reported in the Syrian Arab Republic, with the majority in Deir-ez-Zor (25) and the rest in Aleppo (5), Idlib (3), Al-Hasakeh (2) and Hama (1). One case was reported in 2014.

- The sixth countrywide vaccination campaign for polio took place from 4 to 8 May 2014. The results of the campaign, including an evaluation of vaccine access to hard-to-reach areas, is currently under way. Figures on the numbers of children reached, including by governorate, are not expected to be available until the third week of May.

- According to the Ministry of Health, areas in 29 districts of 11 governorates were not accessible during the April polio immunization round: Dar'a (4); Homs (1); Al-Hasakeh (2); Damascus (3); Aleppo (1) Quneitra (1); Ar Raqqah (3); Rural Damascus (7); Lattakia (2); Hama (5); and Deir-ez-Zor (1). Based on the recommendations of WHO and UNICEF, the Ministry of Health agreed to extend the response efforts until November 2014 (the phase II outbreak response plan, covering the response in the whole subregion, is under development).

- The fifth round of the response to the polio outbreak in the Syrian Arab Republic of April achieved the immunization of approximately 3 million children across the country. Immunization was carried out in all governorates. Post-campaign monitoring data from all sources have found that over 85 per cent of monitored children were reported to have been immunized in all but one governorate (Rural Damascus).

- In addition to the ongoing polio campaign, a vaccination week was held in the Syrian Arab Republic (26 to 30 April) as part of World Immunization Week. The campaign aimed to provide catch-up routine vaccinations to children and women who had previously missed out. Of the 442,583 children reached, around one third, or 143,684, received the needed vaccinations. Of the 257,381

women reached, around 35 per cent. or 89,238, were eligible for a tetanus vaccination. The governorates of Aleppo, Dar'a, Al-Hasakeh and Deir-ez-Zor had a very poor response to the campaign.

- Measles outbreaks are of increasing concern. From the end of March to 3 May, 965 cases of suspected measles were reported through the early warning and reporting system, including 378 in Ar Raqqah, and 341 in Deir-ez-Zor. In response, the Ministry of Health will implement a measles vaccination campaign immediately after the May polio round. UNICEF will provide the Ministry of Health with 1.3 million doses of monovalent measles vaccine to respond to the outbreak and to sustain the routine vaccination programme until the end of 2014. WHO will support the outbreak response campaign and routine vaccinations by covering part of the operational costs and will also provide technical support through WHO focal points in the field.

4. Administrative hurdles

Clearance procedures for convoys

- On 27 March, the Government communicated a new procedure for unaccompanied truck clearance, whereby trucks will be checked and sealed at warehouses and not searched at checkpoints. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed in writing that instructions regarding the new procedure and expectations for compliance had been communicated to military checkpoints. However, a lack of harmonization and understanding of the procedure by security forces led to significant problems and delays during the first two weeks of May. At least 150 agency trucks have been stopped or turned back at checkpoints, especially at the entrance to Damascus. Security personnel have requested facilitation letters in addition to the ones already required. A technical committee has been created to discuss the issue and seek solutions. It is not clear how long it will take to resolve the problem. The position of the United Nations remains that inspection is to be followed by the sealing of trucks to facilitate passage at checkpoints.

Approval of requests for inter-agency convoys to hard-to-reach areas

Hard-to-reach areas

- In the reporting period, eight requests were made for convoys to hard-to-reach areas: Talbiseh/Mashraf (1 convoy/2 destinations), Alfoa'a, Kyfra, Binnish (Idlib) and Adra al-Omaliyeh (2) and Adra al-Balad (2). Six were approved and two were not. Convoys to Adra al-Balad and Adra al-Omaliyeh could not proceed as planned during the period from 6 to 8 May. Two new requests for these locations were submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and approved on 15 May. Plans are for the convoy to proceed on 22 May, with modalities still being discussed.

Besieged areas

- Five inter-agency convoy requests were made to besieged communities: Douma (2), Madamyiet Elsham (2) and Nubul and Zahra (1). Two were unanswered (Madamyiet Elsham); one to Douma was approved on 24 May but,

despite the approval, could not proceed as no agreement was reached on the inclusion of medical supplies. A second request for Douma was made on 13 May and answered verbally on 15 May for a planned departure during the period from 19 to 22 May, with modalities still being discussed. One convoy proceeded to Nubul and Zahra, reaching as well four hard-to-access villages in opposition-held areas.

Empowered interlocutors

- *Government of the Syrian Arab Republic*. A security focal point is now included in the joint working group of the United Nations and the Syrian Government established following the adoption of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014). Meetings are taking place on an almost daily basis between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Humanitarian Coordinator.
- *Opposition*. The opposition is still unable to designate empowered interlocutors. The fragmented nature of the opposition makes it difficult to have a clearly identified interlocutor for armed opposition groups. Ad hoc local engagement is ongoing to negotiate access. Interlocutors vary, depending on the localities for which access is being negotiated.

Visas

- A total of 48 United Nations visa or renewal requests remain pending. The revised visa policy established by the Syrian Government on 4 March continued to be implemented. From 22 April to 15 May, the United Nations submitted 38 new requests for visas or visa renewals. Of these, 11 were approved within the agreed time frame of 15 working days, and 27 remain pending.
- In addition, 21 requests for visas or visa renewals submitted prior to the reporting period remain pending.
- No new requests for visas or visa renewals for international non-governmental organizations were approved during the reporting period, leaving a total of 13 visa requests pending.

Humanitarian hubs

- The Qamishli hub is functional, with international staff of UNICEF, the Department of Safety and Security, WFP, UNHCR, WHO and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs present on a permanent basis.
- The Aleppo hub is still being operationalized and is currently staffed with national staff. Missions to Aleppo meant that international staff were present during the reporting period (UNHCR mission on 26 April; UNICEF mission from 29 April to 3 May; inter-agency mission from 6 to 11 May).

International non-governmental organization partners

- During the reporting period, no new requests were received from international non-governmental organizations for approval to work in the Syrian Arab Republic.

- The number of international non-governmental organizations approved to work in the Syrian Arab Republic has been reduced to 16 (departure of one non-governmental organization at the request of the Government in view of its cross-border activities and a decision by another not to work in the country). An international non-governmental organization requested to cease operations by the Government met with senior representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 19 May and agreed to remain in touch and to continue discussion about its role in the Syrian Arab Republic.
- International non-governmental organizations are still not authorized to work directly with national non-governmental organizations and are not allowed to accompany United Nations convoys to the field.

National non-governmental organization partners

- During the reporting period, three national non-governmental organizations were approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to partner with United Nations organizations in Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh and Damascus governorates. On 15 May, one national non-governmental organization operating in Ar Raqqah governorate was officially dissolved.
- Some 84 national non-governmental organizations are authorized to operate through 141 of their branches countrywide. There are now 18 national non-governmental organizations allowed to work in Aleppo, 15 in Al-Hasakeh, 8 in Deir-ez-Zor, but only 6 in Rural Damascus, 4 in Dar'a and Idlib, and 3 in Ar Raqqah.

5. Funding

- Around $695.6 million of funding for the Syrian crisis was registered during the reporting period. Of this amount, $214.9 million was for activities inside the Syrian Arab Republic and $480.7 million was to support Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries.
- Of the total amount reported for the Syrian Arab Republic during the current period, 76.2 per cent ($163.7 million) was for activities included in the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan. For neighbouring countries, 73.9 per cent ($355.4 million) of the amount reported was for activities included in the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan.
- As at 19 May, total funding for Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan and the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan stood at 24 per cent of that requested ($6.5 billion requested, $1.59 billion received).

6. Overview of United Nations humanitarian response

Food assistance

- In the May 2014 dispatch cycle, food deliveries are ongoing at a much slower pace owing to difficulties in the implementation of a new transport facilitation mechanism for sealing trucks. As at 12 May, WFP has only been able to dispatch food rations to assist 942,000 people in 10 of the 14 Syrian

governorates, reaching 22 per cent of the 4.25 million people targeted, in comparison to the 47 per cent achieved by the same time in April.

- WFP received approvals and facilitation letters that enabled the delivery of 775,282 family food rations in April (in support of nearly 3.9 million people) and, at the time of writing, 148,542 family rations in May (in support of 942,710 people).

- UNRWA provided food to 102,476 people and cash assistance to 235,491 people. Of this, assistance to 28,576 people was provided in hard-to-reach areas. UNICEF provided nutritional supplies to 22,650 children under five years of age.

Core relief items and shelter

- UNHCR participated in a United Nations inter-agency mission to Ras al-Ain and distributed core relief items to 9,000 people.

- After 14 months without access, UNHCR finally reached Al-Nabek, located in the Al-Qalamoun district. One of the purposes of the visit was to monitor the distribution of core relief items for 10,000 persons. UNHCR dispatches core relief items to cover the needs of 60,000 beneficiaries weekly; this includes the host community in Al-Nabek and internally displaced persons who fled from Al-Sahel, Meshrefeh and Jaʻjeer.

- During the reporting period, IOM delivered non-food items to 27,964 beneficiaries, including 3,702 beneficiaries in hard-to-reach areas.

- During the reporting period, UNICEF provided blankets and quilts to 74,650 people in need in Aleppo, Rural Damascus and Homs through its regular programmes.

Health

- WHO delivered a shipment targeting 117,000 beneficiaries in the hard-to-reach area of Ar Raqqah city. Two trucks loaded with 40 metric tons of lifesaving medicines to treat chronic diseases as well as surgical equipment reached Ar Raqqah on 4 May to support the local health authorities and non-governmental organizations, including the Syrian Arab Red Crescent.

- UNICEF provided health-care assistance to 5,000 people in Kafraya Maar Tamsarin in Idlib governorate.

- UNFPA supported 28 mobile clinics, 27 static clinics and 13 medical points operated by its partners in Damascus, Rural Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, Deir-ez-Zor, Ar Raqqah and Hama, which have been providing lifesaving reproductive health services to more than 21,500 women.

- Some 1,000 women benefited from specialized reproductive health care through free-of-cost, reproductive health vouchers. In addition, at the request of the Ministry of Health, UNFPA procured and delivered 2,000 anti-D injections to cover the gap in unavailability of the medicine. UNFPA also provided 300 primary health-care centres and three referral hospitals of the Ministry of Health, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and the Syrian Family

Planning Association with medical equipment, reproductive health supplies, medicines and contraceptives.

- UNFPA assisted clinics and mobile teams of the Syrian Family Planning Association and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent in Damascus, Rural Damascus, Homs, Lattakia, Tartous, Idlib and Dar'a and provided 2,250 women affected by the crisis with psychosocial support services and psychological first aid services. Similarly, about 105 survivors of gender-based violence, who reported to Syrian Family Planning Association clinics, received medical counselling, community services, and social and legal advice.

Water, sanitation and hygiene

- In Deir-ez-Zor governorate, UNICEF delivered 50 metric tons of hypochloride to the Department of Water Resources. Some 20 metric tons of hypochloride was delivered to the Department in Al Raqqah governorate (fully under opposition control) for treatment of the drinking water supply. It is estimated that 1.3 million people in opposition-controlled areas will benefit from safe drinking water as a result of this intervention.

- In response to the water crisis in Aleppo, UNICEF provided a 1,000 kVA generator which was installed by the Water Board in the Tashrin area. As a result, 500,000 people are benefiting from access to clean water.

- Around 30,000 people have had improved access to safe water in Idlib, following the support provided by UNICEF to the water authorities in the form of generators and storage tanks. Two generators (250 kVA, 350 kVA) were delivered to the Water Authority for Harim during the reporting period, while two additional generators of 100 kVA each were delivered to Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, benefiting 20,000 people.

Education

- UNICEF, in partnership with the Directorate of Education and local non-governmental organizations, distributed 22,904 school bags and supplies in Abu Rasin, Al-Hasakeh city, Amouda and Qamishli in the governorate of Al-Hasakeh.

- UNICEF, in partnership with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and the Directorate of Education distributed education supplies for 31,060 students in Harim, Jisr ash-Shugur, Khan Shaykun and Ma'arrat al-Nu'man in the governorate of Idlib.

Palestine refugees

- UNRWA provided food to 102,476 people and cash assistance to 235,491, including to 28,576 people in hard-to-reach areas.

- In addition, UNRWA provided education to 40,589 students, 77,357 health-care consultations and non-food items (mattresses and blankets) to 9,830 people.

Agriculture

- FAO provided 58,163 beneficiaries with agricultural assistance: 48,734 people in Aleppo received wheat bran, barley and wheat seeds; 875 people in Idlib received animal feed; and 8,554 people in Rural Damascus received laying hens and poultry feed.

Protection and community services

- UNHCR continued to extend support through six offices, 11 community centres, partner organizations and outreach volunteers. These centres offer a range of social services to civilians affected by the conflict, including vocational and skills training, legal counselling, social and recreational activities, and health awareness.

- Protection agencies continued the provision of capacity-building on prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence. Between 22 and 24 April 2014, 33 staff of five national and international non-governmental organizations present in six governorates were trained. UNHCR also provided support for a workshop on child protection and psychosocial support held from 11 to 15 May, aimed at strengthening the response to protection concerns identified during recreational and other activities with children.